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INTRODUCTION
In 1979, Congress established the Office of the Special Counsel
(OSC) under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act)'
as an independent investigative and prosecutive arm of the United
States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board).2 The
CSRA enumerated eleven specific prohibited personnel practices3
and empowered OSC to investigate and prosecute these prohibited
practices for corrective and disciplinary action.4 Without doubt, the
protection of employees from reprisal for protected activity, in par-
ticular "whistleblowing," was a primary purpose of the Act.5
Although Congress intended each of the agencies to protect the
merit system 6 against prohibited personnel practices, it made OSC
I. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.) (effective Jan. 11, 1979). The CSRA represented the first comprehensive reform of
the federal civil service system since the Pendleton Act of 1883. See Frazier v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing shortcomings of Pendleton
Act and events leading to enactment of CSRA).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8),
103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (West Supp. 1990)).
3. The prohibited personnel practices are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)-(11)
(1988), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 4, 103 Stat. 32 (current version at
5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(1)-(1 1) (West Supp. 1990)). They cover unlawful discrimination; solicit-
ing or considering recommendations not based on personal knowledge; coercing political ac-
tivity; reprisals for refusing to engage in political activity; obstructing the right to compete for
employment; influencing applicants to withdraw from competition; granting unauthorized
preferences; nepotism; reprisals for whistleblowing and exercising appeal rights; discrimina-
tion for conduct not adversely affecting performance; and violations of laws, rules, or regula-
tions which directly concern merit system principles. Id.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(4)(A)-(E) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989, § 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. 19 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp.
1990)). In addition, OSC enforces provisions of the Hatch Act governing employee participa-
tion in partisan political activities, serves as a secure channel through which employees may
disclose waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal government, and investigates allegations of
other personnel activities prohibited by civil service law, rule or regulation. Id. § 1206(b)(2)-
(3) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. 19 (current
version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(a)(3)-(5) (West Supp. 1990)).
5. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 165 n.1 (1979); see infra note 42 and accompanying text
(noting statutory definition of protected whistleblowing activities). According to Senator Pat-
rick Leahy's ground-breaking report on federal whistleblowers, the term whistleblower was
coined as "a catch-all word used to describe almost any case involving a federal employee who
encounters career problems after bringing information to public light." SENATE COMM. ON
GOV'T AFFAIRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: A REPORT ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DISCLOSE
ACTS OF GOVERNMENTAL WASTE, ABUSE, AND CORRUPTION, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (Comm.
Print 1978) [hereinafter Leahy Report]. The Senate committee report accompanying the Civil
Service Reform Act defined whistleblowers as federal employees "who disclose illegal or im-
proper government activities." S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2723, 2730 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 969].
6. The merit system or merit employment system refers to those civil service laws,
rules, and regulations that provide for open competitive examinations to test and evaluate the
relative merit and fitness of applicants for positions in the competitive service consistent with
the basic principle that appointments to and personnel actions within the civil service be
based solely on merit and fitness. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 300.102, 330.101 (1990) (noting policy that
competitive hiring practices be based on merit). Existing merit system safeguards ensure that
appointments and other personnel decisions are made for proper and lawful reasons and
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the system's chief enforcer.7
The impetus for statutory protection for whistleblowers derived
from a variety of developments, experiences, and events. These in-
clude the changing nature of federal government,8 emerging first
amendment doctrines concerning the public employee,9 a growing
protect against the improper use or abuse of personnel authorities which may tend to under-
mine the integrity of the merit system. See 124 CONG. REc. 27,538 (1978) (noting that thrust
of CSRA is to assure that federal employee's career prospects are directly tied to performance
and to ensure that employee's rights are protected) (statement of Sen. A. Ribicoff). After
several unsuccessful attempts at reform, the merit system was introduced to the federal civil
service in 1883 by the Pendleton Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403, to create politically neutral
personnel management and to replace a spoils system which had become ingrained in the
fabric of American politics. 124 CONG. REC. 27,543-44 (statement of Sen. T. Stevens) (1978).
Among the sweeping changes ushered in by the Pendleton Act was the establishment of a
three-member, bipartisan Civil Service Commission to provide for competitive examinations,
ensure political neutrality, and condition job tenure on actual performance. Id. at 27,544.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8),
103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (West Supp. 1990)); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(c)
(1988); see Special Counsel v. Russell, 32 M.S.P.R. 115, 120 (1987) (noting that OSC could
proceed against employee for sexual harassment despite fact agency heads also had been
given authority).
8. For a general discussion of the factors that engendered whistleblower protection in
the Act, see Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REv. 615, 616-18 [hereinafter Vaughn, Statutory Protection]. Perhaps nowhere was the
justification for statutory whistleblower protection made more apparent than in the seven-
month study of whistleblowers and whistleblower problems conducted by Senator Leahy and
his staff in 1977. The Leahy Report identified a number of different justifications for
whistleblower protection. The report accepted as its premise the goal of greater efficiency
and the elimination ofwaste, misfeasance, and malfeasance in government. Leahy Report, supra
note 5, at 10. The report recognized, however, that as the federal government grew "larger
and more complex, the opportunities for inefficiency, corruption, mismanagement, abuse of
power, and other inappropriate activities bec[a]me more frequent." Id. The report found
that when employees revealed incidents of such activities and conditions, the bureaucracy
tended to react not to the revelations themselves but to the employee who had revealed them.
Id. at 12. It concluded that in the modem bureaucracies, certain built-in incentives naturally
produced this phenomenon. The report stated:
The acid test for an agency is whether it is recognized as a smooth running organiza-
tion providing a useful public service. As such, federal employees are not en-
couraged to be on the lookout for waste or inefficiency, as are their private sector
counterparts [whose motivation is to maximize profit]. The key to success in the
bureaucracy is to be quiet, to do competent work, and to move slowly up the hierar-
chy.
An employee who makes known instances of governmental waste, misfeasance, or
malfeasance upsets the standard operating procedure. His or her questioning of
agency patterns and practices may upset the cohesion a large organization needs in
order to operate. Any evidence of wrongdoing hurts the agency's image, reflecting
poorly upon the officials in charge and possibly jeopardizing its appropriations.
Id. at 11-12. In addition, the report noted that concurrent with the growth in the federal
bureaucracy, policy makers in the executive agencies were becoming further removed from
the information readily accessible to the "policy implementors," those "front line" employees
providing government services to the public. Id. at 7. This phenomenon, the report con-
cluded, made it even more imperative that lines of "vertical communication" be kept open
and protected from interference, which the report found often had not been the case. Id at
16-21.
9. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 563-81 (1970) (discussing
emerging first amendment protection for federal employees during 1960s); see also Vaughn,
Statutory Protection, supra note 8, at 637-41 (discussing first amendment and CRSA
whistleblower protections); Leahy Report, supra note 5, at 40-47 (discussing first amendment
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public distrust of government,10 increasing attention to the plight of
the federal whistleblower," l the ineffectiveness of existing remedies
and protection mechanisms to protect whistleblowing, 12 the enact-
ment of the federal Freedom of Information Act,13 and widespread
political support for whistleblower reform. 14 In response to these
and weaknesses of protection that it provides to federal whistleblowers). In 1968, the
Supreme Court decided that the first amendment did protect the speech of government em-
ployees, rejecting out of hand the notion that government employment was an unprotected
privilege. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (discussing
development of first amendment protections for government employees prior to Pickering de-
cision). Prior to the CSRA, the first amendment right to free speech and right to petition in
whistleblower or grievance-type activities, as delineated in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Pickering and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), figured prominently in judicial
decisions. See, e.g., Burkett v. United States, 402 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (citing
Pickering and New York Times and discussing constitutional protection of free speech); Swaaley
v. United States, 376 F.2d 857, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding petition by federal employee to be
covered by first amendment); cf Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 831-35 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(balancing first amendment protection with disharmony produced by unrestrained public
speech of government employee), vacated on other grounds, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
10. The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal contributed to a public mind set that
was suspicious of government, accustomed to the expression of dissent, and desirous of more
controls to prevent government wrongdoing. Vaughn, Statutory Protection, supra note 8, at 618.
11. The Leahy Report examined 70 whistleblower cases and provided extensive documen-
tation on 15 sampled whistleblower experiences, an unprecedented effort in this area. Leahy
Report, supra note 5, at v. In addition, the case of Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian employee who in
1968 had revealed to Congress mismanagement and billion-dollar cost overruns in a defense
contractor's development of the C5A transport program, had attained public notoriety not
only for the extent of Fitzgerald's disclosures, but also for the extent to which the United
States Air Force retaliated against him for those disclosures. Id. at 6. Fitzgerald brought suit
against the United States Air Force for damages claiming unlawful discharge. The case ulti-
mately reached the Supreme Court where it was the subject of two precedent setting decisions
on executive immunity. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 739, 749 (1982) (holding President
has absolute immunity from damages arising from his official acts); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (holding presidential aides enjoy only qualified immunity from damage
suits).
12. The Leahy Report documented numerous cases in which the law and the Civil Service
Commission were inadequate to protect whistleblowers from reprisal and the threat of repri-
sal. Id. at 36-47. The report found that whistleblowers had been "fired, transferred, repri-
manded, denied promotions, RIFFED .... harassed through the misuse of formal discipline
procedures," and subjected to informal harassment "designed to neutralize [them]." Id. at 1.
It found that the employee grievance procedures, rather than helping whistleblowers, had
served "to significantly weaken their position[s]" and had become "actually a frustrating and
biased exercise." Id. at 3. It further found that the Commission had been ineffective in pro-
tecting whistleblowers and that Congress had not offered real assistance to these employees.
Id. at 4. Finally, the report concluded that the courts had been "reluctant to play an active
role in the whistleblower problem." It stated that "[a]lthough statutes do exist which might
be interpreted as applicable to whistleblower cases, the Courts appear to be waiting for Con-
gress and the Executive Branch to resolve this problem." Id.
13. See Vaughn, Statutory Protection, supra note 8, at 617-18 (concluding that passage of
Freedom of Information Act in 1976 legitimized notion that federal documents constituted
public information which public had legitimate right to know, thus vindicating whistleblowers
on same premise).
14. See id. at 618-20 (noting that whisdeblower protection was supported by Carter Ad-
ministration-in particular that as candidate, Carter had promised to introduce protections
for whistleblowers if elected-and that Act was implemented in Congress "without significant
dissent"). "The ideological breadth of the coalition supporting whistleblower protection,"
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converging forces, the 95th Congress, for the first time, adopted
comprehensive legislation protecting specifically identified em-
ployee speech and related activity from reprisal. 15 Although the ad-
ministration's initial whistleblower protection proposal called only
for the protection of allegations of violations of law, rules, or regula-
tions, Congress expanded whistleblowing activities to include dis-
closures which evidenced mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or a specific danger to public health and
safety.16
In addition to the protection given to whistleblowing activities,
the CSRA protected employees from reprisal for the exercise of any
lawful appeal right.17 During the first decade under the Act, the two
wrote Vaughn, "indicates that the passage of these provisions is a strong congressional state-
ment in support of the legitimacy of whistleblowing." Id. at 619-20.
15. The CSRA also included protections for all the rights of the first amendment which
include the freedoms of speech, expression, and religion, and the right to petition the govern-
ment for grievances. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(I 1) (1988), amended by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 4, 103 Stat. 32 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302
(West Supp. 1990)). Of course, these constitutionally protected rights predated the CSRA
and carried with them similar guarantees against reprisal. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 574 (1967) (holding that teacher's statement critical of school board's spending
program could not form basis for dismissal from public employment).
16. The relevant portion of the Act provides:
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or
approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority-
(8) take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to any employee or appli-
cant for employment as a reprisal for-
(A) a disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the em-
ployee or applicant reasonably believes evidences-
(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such disclo-
sure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not
specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; or
(B) a disclosure to the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection
Board, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee desig-
nated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information
which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences-
(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 4,103 Stat. 32 (cur-
rent version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302 (West Supp. 1990)).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) (1988), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
§ 4,103 Stat. 32 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(9) (West Supp. 1990)). The Act
provides in relevant part:
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or
approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority-
(9) take or fail to take any personnel action against any employee or applicant
for employment as a reprisal for the exercise of any appeal right granted by any
law, rule, or regulation.
Id. § 2302(b)(9), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 32 (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(9)(A) (West Supp. 1990)).
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protected activities, whistleblowing and the exercise of a lawful ap-
peal right, were the mainstay of the Special Counsel's enforcement
program, with whistleblower protection occupying the office's high-
est priority. Is
To accomplish the goal of enforcing the CSRA's protections
against prohibited personnel practices, Congress provided OSC
with investigative and prosecutive authority and authorized the
United States Merit Systems Protection Board to hear and adjudi-
cate such prosecutions.' 9
18. See M. Wieseman, Remarks of the Special Counsel Before the MSPB Practitioner's Forum, 87
F.M.S.R. 47, 49 (Nov. 30, 1987). In an audit of the OSC, the Comptroller General of the
United States found as of December 1984 that although whistleblower reprisal allegations
constituted only 13% of all matters received by OSC, whistleblower reprisal allegations con-
stituted 42% of the cases under active investigation. CoMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, WHISTLEBLOWER CoMPLAINTs RARELY QUALIFY FOR OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL
PROTECrION 18 (1985) [hereinafter WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS]. Furthermore, the General
Accounting Office auditors found that although OSC had referred all new matters after initial
intake and inquiry for some fuller investigation at a rate of only 8%, the agency had referred a
disproportionate 41%o of all whistleblower reprisal allegations for more comprehensive inves-
tigation. Id. at 20. That OSC employed an initial screening process to identify employee
complaints of prohibited personnel practice with potential merit was consistent with Con-
gress' intent that OSC prevent frivolous or unmeritorious cases from clogging the appeals
system. Idl at 9-10.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 1206(a)(1) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990)); 5
U.S.C. § 1205(a) (1988), renumbered and amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
§ 3(a)(7), 103 Stat. 17 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1204(a) (West Supp. 1990)). Specifi-
cally, the Act provided for both corrective actions and disciplinary actions before the Board. 5
U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103
Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1212(a)(2)(B), 1214 (West Supp. 1990)); 5 U.S.C.
§ 1206(g), 1207 (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat.
18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215 (West Supp. 1990)). A corrective action is an admin-
istrative proceeding before the MSPB (if the agency has refused to take corrective action upon
a request from the Special Counsel) in which OSC reports its findings to the Board and rec-
ommends that the Board order an agency to correct -the prohibited personnel practice found.
5 U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103
Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990)). A corrective action is
remedial in nature and concerns primarily employees or applicants harmed by the violation.
Compare 5 U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214 (West Supp. 1990)) with 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1206(g), 1207 (1988) (allowing for disciplinary actions), repealed by Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1212(a)(2)(B), 1215
(West Supp. 1990)). In addition to the authority to request retroactive corrective action for
an employee, the Act gave OSC the authority to request the Board to stay temporarily any
personnel action pending an OSC investigation where there was reason to believe that a pro-
hibited personnel practice would result or had resulted from a personnel action. Id. § 1208,
repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5
U.S.C.A. § 1214(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1990). A disciplinary action is also an administrative
proceeding before the Board in which OSC seeks to have the Board discipline an employee
who has committed a prohibited personnel practice. Id. § 1206(g)(1), repealed by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1215(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990)). Congress established a disciplinary procedure which af-
fords the charged employee with due process rights consistent with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. See id. §§ 554, 556-57 (setting out logistics of hearing process under Administrative
Procedure Act). An employee charged with a disciplinary complaint by OSC has a right to
answer the complaint, representation, a hearing before the MSPB or an administrative law
1020
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Since its inception, OSC's role in the enforcement of the CSRA's
protections for whistleblowers has been the subject of intense de-
bate, scrutiny, and controversy. 20 Much of the early controversy
centered on the perception that OSC had not succeeded before the
MSPB in its mission to obtain relief for employees complaining of
whistleblower reprisal and sanctions against managers committing
reprisals.2 1 Contrary to this perception, the record indicates that
OSC has tried to develop a body of administrative law-although, as
will be discussed, not always successfully-which maximizes protec-
tion for federal employees who engage in protected activity, facili-
tates OSC's ability to bring successful corrective and disciplinary
actions when reprisals occur, and upholds the safeguards of the
merit system Congress envisioned. This Article analyzes the first
ten years of federal reprisal law under the CSRA. The analysis
traces the law's development, explores the impact of that develop-
ment on federal whistleblower protection policy, and describes the
OSC's role in the development of this unique body of law. The Arti-
cle also describes the recent changes in the federal reprisal law that
result from the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
(WPA).22 The Article concludes that although the Whistleblower
Protection Act amendments to the CSRA have enhanced protection
for federal employees from reprisal, this legislation may have been
judge appointed by the Board, a transcript of the hearing, a written decision from the Board
to be issued at the earliest practical date, and an appeal to the United States court of appeals
for the circuit in which the employee resides or is employed at the time of the action. Id.
§ 1207(a), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Star. 18 (current
version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990)). The Board may impose removal, re-
duction in grade, debarment from federal employment not to exceed five years, suspension,
reprimand, or a civil penalty not to exceed $1000. Id. § 1207(b), repealed by Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1990)). Because of the deterrent effect of its punitive nature, disciplinary actions
promote and encourage the protected activity.
20. WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS, supra note 18, at 3-4, 35, 49-50. GAO summarized
this controversy in the following terms:
In its 6-year history, OSC has been the object of criticism from federal employee
representatives, GAO, and the Congress. OSC has been described as administra-
tively inept, ineffective in prosecuting violations, and of little benefit to federal em-
ployee complainants such as whistleblowers alleging management reprisal for their
disclosures. As a result, questions have been raised in the Congress as to whether
OSC should continue to exist, and if it should, whether alterations are needed in its
powers or in its statutory authorization.
Id. at 35. After a lengthy investigation, GAO concluded that by 1984 OSC had overcome
earlier administrative deficiencies and reported that OSC was effectively handling allegations
of reprisal for whistleblowing. Id. at 36. In fact, GAO concluded that based on its review of
closed files, it "could not disagree with OSC's decision to close these cases." Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 27 (stating that "[h]istorically, a major focus of the criticism of the Office of the
Special Counsel has been that OSC had been unsuccessful in prosecuting complaints of pro-
hibited personnel practices before the Merit Systems Protection Board").
22. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (effective July 9, 1989) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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unnecessary had there been greater receptivity to OSC's efforts to
shape the law into a reasonable and workable tool for promoting
whistleblowing and deterring retaliatory activity in the federal
workplace.
I. IN RE FRAZiER: THE BASIC REPRISAL MODEL
The Board's first opportunity to apply the new statutory protec-
tions of the CSRA against reprisal came in the case of In re Frazier,
OSC's first corrective action case.23 In Frazier, four deputy marshals
employed by the United States Marshals Service received directed
geographic reassignments allegedly in reprisal for whistleblowing
and for exercising their lawful appeal rights.2 4 After an OSC investi-
gation and an MSPB order temporarily staying the reassignments,
OSC moved to halt the reassignments permanently by filing a cor-
rective action with the Board alleging violations of section
2302(b)(8) and (9).25
The Frazier corrective action was a matter of first impression for
the Board. The Board not only had to establish a substantive stan-
dard for determining whether the reassignments had violated the
statute's proscriptions, it had to define the procedural ground rules
23. 1 M.S.P.R. 163 (1979).
24. In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R. 163, 166 (1979). The deputies disclosed information critical
of management to two members of Congress and filed or participated in various complaints
and grievances concerning race discrimination, work-place harassment, supervisory incompe-
tence, inefficient office procedures, and an incident in which deputies were permitted to play
cards and drink alcohol during a morale-building outing on official time, all matters which
they reasonably believed evidenced mismanagement and violations of agency regulations. Id.
at 170-71. The congressional disclosures, which were made after the deputies received no
relief through the agency's equal employment opportunity (EEO) and grievance appeal
processes, prompted a congressional inquiry to the agency. Id. at 171-73. Ray Lora, special
assistant to the Director of the Marshals Service, had been sent to the Atlanta office, site of the
controversy, to investigate. Id at 172-73. Within a day or two of Lora's investigation, the
local United States Marshal, Ronald Angel, recommended to William Hall, Marshals Service
Director, that three of the four deputies who had made disclosures be reassigned from the
Atlanta office. Id. at 173. Angel's recommendation, the deputies alleged, was in reprisal for
their disclosures. Id. at 166. Hall did not act on Angel's request. Id. at 180. Instead, he
appointed a management review team to look into the situation at Atlanta and make recom-
mendations to him. Id. During the review, the team interviewed each of the complaining
deputies and listened to their criticisms. Id. at 181. Based on the review, the team concluded,
among other things, that there had been a breakdown in communication within the Atlanta
Office, that office morale was very low, and that the office was being poorly managed. Id. at
181-82. The team made a number of specific recommendations to Director Hall concerning
the problems they had discovered, including geographic reassignments for the four
whistleblowers and one management official. Id. at 182. Hall implemented only the recom-
mendation that the whistleblowers be reassigned. Id. at 170. The issue presented was
whether Hall or the team members had acted in reprisal for any of the deputies' protected
activities. Id. at 187.
25. Id. at 167.
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for the action.26
A. The Corrective Action Provisions of the CSRA
From the start, OSC took an aggressive, pro-whistleblower stance.
In the absence of any statutorily mandated hearing, OSC advocated
the adoption of a streamlined dispute-resolution process to be
based on the results of OSC's investigation and whatever comments
the agency or Office of Personnel Management (OPM) submitted to
the Board for consideration under the statute's right-to-comment
provision.27 OSC argued that a full evidentiary hearing was neither
required by Congress nor necessary for the Board to determine
whether corrective action was appropriate, since the Board had the
benefit of the entire fact-finding record of OSC's investigation and
the agency's and OPM's comments on the investigation and recom-
mended action.
28
Nowhere in the 1978 legislation did Congress provide for an evi-
dentiary hearing in cases brought by OSC for corrective action.
29
Congress' only requirement was that the Board give the agency and
OPM an opportunity to comment on OSC's findings and recom-
mendations before determining what corrective action was appro-
priate.30 Congress' legislative approach in corrective actions was
fundamentally different from its approach in disciplinary actions and
employee-initiated appeals before the Board. In those procedures,
Congress explicitly provided for the right to a hearing. 31 OSC be-
lieved it was proposing a procedure that was consistent with con-
gressional intent and would enhance its ability to enforce the law.3 2
Such a streamlined process would permit OSC to bring more cor-
rective action cases more quickly, obtain expedited relief for com-
plainants, allocate its limited resources to investigation rather than
26. See id. at 182-200 (discussing standard for determining whether reassignments had
violated CSRA).
27. Id. at 182. The OSC based its position on 5 U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1)(B), repealed by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1214(b)(3) (West Supp. 1990)) and its failure to mention the availability of a hearing. Id. at
182-83.
28. Id. at 182.
29. See id. at 183 (noting lack of specificity of statutory language under which corrective
action proceeding is to be conducted).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 1206(c)(1)(B) (1988).
31. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7701 (West Supp. 1990) (providing for hearing); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 1207 (1988) (providing for hearing), repealed by Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989,
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990)).
32. See Post-Hearing Brief of the Special Counsel at 5-6, In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R. 163
(1979) (requiring evidentiary hearing undermines agency willingness to cooperate with OSC
and OSC's statutory authority).
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litigation, and expand the influence of the office.33 Under the cir-
cumstances, OSC argued, a hearing would only prolong the viola-
tion, delay the determination and order for relief, require
government resources to be expended needlessly, and duplicate the
fact-finding process that OSC had already performed pursuant to its
statutory mandate.
34
In addressing the issue, the Board interpreted the statute's right-
to-comment provision as establishing only a minimum require-
ment. 35 The Board reasoned that it could, in its discretion, permit
the agency and OPM an even greater opportunity for persuasion
than the statutory right-to-comment requirement.3 6 Finding that
both OSC and the agency were entitled to a presumption that they
were "acting in good faith and according to the law," the Board or-
dered that a hearing be held to resolve conflicts in testimony.3 7 The
Board based its ruling on its inherent power under the CSRA to
"hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or adjudication, of all
matters within the jurisdiction of the Board ... "38
B. Reprisal for Whistleblowing
On the principal issue of whether the Marshals Service had retali-
ated against the deputies for their disclosures to members of Con-
gress, the Board agreed with OSC on the definition of
whistleblowing but resolved the reprisal issue against OSC and the
deputies.39 The OSC contended and the Board agreed that the dis-
closures, which had prompted the Marshals Service to look into the
deputies' situation, were protected under section 2302(b)(8). 40 The
agency had argued that the deputies' disclosures were not protected
because the deputies had blown the whistle in order to insulate
themselves from legitimate disciplinary action.4 1 Rejecting the Mar-
shals Service's premise, the Board held that the statute specifically
protected disclosures if the discloser "reasonably believes" that his
33. See id. at 4-6 (asserting resources of OSC would be "severely strained" were every
petition for corrective action to require hearing).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 183 (noting broad discretion of Board allowed by statute).
36. See id. at 183-84 (noting absolute discretion conferred on Board).
37. In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R. 163, 182-84 (1979).
38. Id. 182 (emphasis added). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the Board's determination, analogizing the relationship be-
tween OSC and the Board to that of a criminal prosecutor and a court. Frazier v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
39. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. at 185-90.
40. Id. at 186-87.
41. Id. at 186.
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disclosure evidences one of the subjects identified in the statute.42
If this condition precedent was satisfied, the Board held, the per-
sonal motives of the deputies were not relevant to whether their dis-
closures were protected.43 In determining whether disclosures
qualified for protection, the Board chose an objective standard of
review based on reasonableness, rather than a subjective standard of
review based on individual motivation.44
Under this standard, the Board found the deputies' disclosures to
be reasonably based and, therefore, protected.45 On the merits of
the reprisal allegation, however, it held that OSC had failed to es-
tablish that Director Hall, the official who ordered the reassign-
ments, or that the management review team, which recommended
the action, had actual or constructive knowledge of the deputies'
disclosures to their elected representatives in Congress. 46 In mak-
ing these factual findings, the Board rejected the testimony of the
deputies who claimed that they had discussed their disclosures with
the review team.47 The Board also declined to infer knowledge
from circumstantial evidence that other management officials, in-
cluding the United States Marshal in Atlanta, had knowledge of the
42. Id. The relevant sections of the Act identify the following subjects as within the am-
bit of protected whistleblowing: "(i) a violation of any law, rule or regulation, or (ii) misman-
agement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety." 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West Supp. 1990).
43. Frazier, I M.S.P.R. at 187.
44. Id. The Board wrote:
It is true, as the Marshals Service has emphasized, that Congress has expressed great
concern that the whistleblower provisions not be abused by dissident employees who
have no legitimate basis for disclosures, but rather are bent upon disruption or upon
creating smoke screens to obscure their own wrongdoing. This, however, does not
mean that there can never be an element of self-interest in whistleblowing activities
protected by section 2302(b)(8). Indeed, since the matters complained of by the
deputies in this case directly affect the deputies themselves, their interest is quite
consonant with the public interest in improving the management and operations of
the Marshals Service.
Id. The Board's decision left open the question of whether reasonably based disclosures
might not be protected where the discloser's intent in making the disclosure was not conso-
nant with public interest. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
would later revisit this issue in employee-appeal cases with mixed results. See infra notes 150,
207-10, 223-27 and accompanying text (discussing seven different cases in which discloser's
purpose was not exclusively public interest).
45. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. at 187.
46. Itt at 189. The Board considered OSC's argument that it apply the "small plant"
doctrine, as used by the National Labor Relations Board in certain unfair labor practice cases,
to infer knowledge on the part of Director Hall. Id.; see A.T. Krajewski Mfg. v. NLRB, 413
F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1969) (finding inferences from circumstantial evidence as to em-
ployer's knowledge permissible when employee engaged in in-plant activity and plant is rela-
tively small). The Board concluded, however, that the "small plant" doctrine was not
applicable to the facts in Frazier because the work force for which Director Hall was responsi-
ble was not small because it included 1,400 employees nationwide. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. at
189.
47. Frazier at 188.
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deputies' disclosures.48 Instead, the Board found credible the testi-
mony of Hall and the team members who had denied any knowledge
of the deputies' whistleblowing to members of Congress. 49 Finding
the requisite element of knowledge to be missing, the Board held
that there could be no reprisal for whistleblowing.50
Because lack of actual or constructive knowledge is fatal to an al-
legation of whistleblower reprisal, the Board could have based its
finding solely on the absence of this element of proof. However, the
Board chose instead to analyze the merits of the agency's justifica-
tion for the reassignments in order to show further that the reas-
signments had not been made in reprisal for the deputies'
disclosures. 5 1 After validating the agency's finding that the deputies
were "hostile, frustrated, disruptive and demonstrably unable to
function effectively in Atlanta," the Board concluded that the man-
agement team's recommendations to reassign the deputies were
"based upon sound management considerations" and made "to ac-
commodate the competing needs of the dissident deputies and
those of the Atlanta office."' 52
Based on the Board's findings that knowledge was lacking and
that the reassignment actions had been based on legitimate manage-
rial decisions, the Board delayed discussion of the broader issues
concerning what quantum of proof would be required to establish
retaliatory motivation and how the burden of proof would be allo-
cated in reprisal cases until its evaluation of OSC's alternative the-
ory for prosecution under section 2302(b)(9).53
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 189.
51. Id. at 190.
52. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Board credited the testimony of three team mem-
bers whose assessments of the deputies were summarized in the opinion:
The team determined that four deputies, Frazier, Morris, Reilly and Love, were to-
tally alienated and distrustful of district management and had become so embittered
that they could no longer present rational arguments to support their concerns.
Moreover, in their testimony before the Board, the team members reiterated some of
their findings and the bases upon which they were reached. Gary Mead testified that
deputy Frazier was "paranoid" with respect to district management, and was unable
to support his general complaints. Mead testified that Love was extremely contemp-
tuous of the district management staff to whom he referred in extremely crude terms.
Russell testified that Deputy Reilly was "totally polarized" and made unrounded alle-
gations that district management took kickbacks from airlines used to transport
prisoners.
Id. at 181-82.
53. Section 2302(b)(9) provides:
Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or ap-
prove any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority... take or fail to
take any personnel action against any employee or applicant for employment as a
reprisal for the exercise of any appeal right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.
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C. Reprisal for the Exercise of Lawful Appeal Rights
In Frazier, OSC had proposed that for reprisal cases under sec-
tions 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9), the Board adopt the Supreme Court's
model for allocating burdens of proof used in discrimination cases
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 The Court's dis-
crimination model placed the initial burden on the party seeking re-
lief to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.5 5 Thereafter,
the burden shifted to the employer to establish a nondiscriminatory
justification for the action.56 If the employer established a nondis-
criminatory justification, the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the justification was pretextual.57 In proposing
that this model be applied in reprisal cases under the CSRA, OSC
argued that in order to account for congressional policy favoring the
protection of employees from reprisals and the inherent disparity of
power between agency and employee, the Board should evaluate the
legitimacy of the employer-agency's justification under a "clear and
convincing evidence" standard of proof, which had been applied by
some federal circuit courts in Title VII cases.
58
OSC further proposed that the Board apply an "any part" test in
evaluating whether retaliation had tainted the action.59 If reprisal
for protected activity played any part in the decision to take the chal-
lenged action, OSC argued, the antireprisal provisions of the statute
had been violated and required a remedy.60 OSC's argument was
premised on the assumption that the CSRA had no tolerance for
reprisals and was supported by a line of analogous Title VII discrim-
ination cases that had applied the "any part" test.61 OSC reasoned
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) (1988), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 4(b), 103
Stat. 32 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(9) (West Supp. 1990)).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
55. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (outlining steps neces-
sary for plaintiff to prove prima fade case). The four steps are: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a
protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for ajob the employer was trying to
fill; (3) though qualified, the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) thereafter the employer continued
to seek applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. Il
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Post-Hearing Brief of the Special Counsel at 9, In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163 (1979)
(citing Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding agency has clear and
convincing burden of proof that absent admitted discrimination plaintiff would not have been
selected); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating
strong presumption in favor of individual member's class alleging employment
discrimination)).
59. Post-Hearing Brief of the Special Counsel at 10-11, In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163
(1979).
60. Id
61. Ia (quoting Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1045 (1975); Perry v. Golub, 464 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Hochstadt v. Worchester
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that retaliation, even if only a partial motivating factor, should be
presumed to have a broad chilling effect on other employees who
wished to exercise their protected rights under the CSRA. 62 In or-
der to remove the threat of that effect and to maintain a federal
work environment that encouraged rather than discouraged pro-
tected activity, OSC contended that the Board could not permit ac-
tions motivated even partially by reprisal to stand. 63 If protected
activity, especially whistleblowing, was to be promoted effectively,
neither the agency nor the Board should endorse actions based,
even in part, on retaliatory motivation. 64
Admittedly, the "any part" test could result in the retention of
employees whose poor performance or misconduct justified, in the
abstract, the agency's action. This was the inevitable result of con-
flicting purposes within the CSRA. The CSRA's goal of promoting
whistleblowing conflicts with its objective of furthering efficiency in
government through discretionary management-directed personnel
actions. 65 In cases where retaliation was only a partial motivating
factor for the personnel action, there was no easy method to achieve
fully both objectives. OSC urged the Board to adopt a test for cau-
sation in dual motivation cases which would err, if at all, on the side
of protecting employees from reprisal.66
Without clear congressional guidance, the Board had to make a
policy decision. On one side weighed the importance of protecting
whistleblowers whose efforts Congress determined would make the
government more efficient.67 On the other side weighed the impor-
tance of removing unnecessary obstacles to legitimate management
actions which Congress determined had impeded the efficiency of
the government prior to the reformation of the Civil Service. 68 The
Board struck the balance in the middle. It held that it would reverse
actions only where OSC could establish that reprisal was a signifi-
Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976); and United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aft'd, 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975)).
62. Id at 13.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10-11.
65. One of the primary purposes of civil service reform under the CSRA was to liberalize
personnel rules for management action. As the Senate Report stated: "One of the central
tasks of the civil service reform bill is simple to express but difficult to achieve: Allow civil
servants to be able to be hired and fired more easily, but for the right reasons." S. REP. No.
969, supra note 5, at 4. The perception of reformers was that the "appeals processes [were] so
lengthy and complicated that [civil service] managers often avoid[ed] taking disciplinary ac-
tion." Id. at 9.
66. Post-Hearing Brief of the Special Counsel at 10-11, In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R 163
(1979).
67. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 195 (1979).
68. Id. at 196.
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cant factor in the decision to take the action.69 Thus, the Board con-
strued the CSRA as tolerating some reprisal motivation in the
adverse personnel action as long as the motivation was not signifi-
cant to the decision. In adopting this significant factor test, the
Board specifically reserved judgment on whether it would adopt the
defense articulated in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle70 as a barrier to remedial action in future cases and held that
the facts of Frazier did not require it to decide this issue. 71
To establish reprisal, the Board announced a four-part test that
incorporated the significant factor standard. The Board held that
OSC must show: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2)
the official responsible for the action had actual or constructive
knowledge of the activity; (3) the employee was treated in an ad-
verse fashion; and (4) a sufficient causal connection existed between
the protected activity and the adverse action to establish that retalia-
tion for the protected activity was a significant factor in the chal-
lenged action.72 The Board in Frazier emphasized that proof of
reprisal need not depend on direct evidence of the offending offi-
cial's retaliatory state of mind.7" Instead, the Board held, the causal
link between the protected activity and the adverse action "merely
consists of an inference of retaliatory motive for the adverse em-
69. Id-
70. 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
71. In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R. 163, 195-96 (1979). The Mt. Healthy defense derives from a
first amendment infringement case decided by the Supreme Court. Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976). The Mt. Healthy defense permits an em-
ployer to defend successfully against a claim of violation of protected rights by demonstrating
with preponderant evidence that it would have taken the same action regardless of the pro-
tected activity. id. at 287. In Mt. Healthy, the Mt. Healthy School Board refused to renew the
employment contract of an untenured teacher who was also the president of the local
teacher's union. Id at 281-82. The decision not to rehire the teacher was based on three
incidents, the first of which involved the teacher's obscene gestures at students. Id- at 282.
The second involved a physical altercation between the teacher and a colleague that resulted
in controversial suspensions for the two and eventually a walkout by a number of teachers. Id-
at 281. The third, and most proximate in time, involved the teacher's release to a local radio
station of an internal school district memorandum concerning the imposition of a teacher
dress code. Id. After the lower courts granted the teacher relief based on the School Board's
infringement of the teacher's first amendment right to release the dress-code memo to the
media, the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a remedy was constitution-
ally required in light of the apparent legitimate grounds for the action. Id. at 295. Although it
recognized that the employee's first amendment activity had played "a substantial part" in the
decision not to rehire him, the Court nevertheless was concerned that providing the teacher a
remedy could place him in a better position than he would be in had he not engaged in the
protected activity. IL- Based on this concern, the Court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the Board would have taken the same action regardless of the teacher's first
amendment activity. Id. at 287. If the Board would have taken the same action, then, in the
Court's view, the constitutional infringement had not caused the challenged action and no
remedy was required. Id.
72. In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R. 163, 196 (1979).
73. Id. at 193-94.
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ployer action."' 74 As the Board further emphasized, "[retaliatory]
motive must in almost all situations be inferred from circumstantial
evidence."
75
The Board did adopt some of the points advocated by OSC under
section 2302(b)(9). For example, OSC urged the Board to consider
not only participation in one's own lawful appeal as an "exercise" of
an appeal right, but also participation in the lawful appeal of an-
other.76 In opposition, the agency argued that mere "participation"
as a witness or counselor in an appeal process of another did not
constitute an "exercise" of an appeal right which section 2302(b)(9)
protected. 77 The Board sided with OSC on this issue and concluded
that participation in a lawful appeal by another fell within the pro-
tective ambit of the CSRA. 78 The Board wrote:
Protection against reprisal is necessary to prevent employer intim-
idation of prospective complainants and witnesses, which would
dry up the channels of information and undermine the implemen-
tation of the statutory policy which the administrative process was
established to serve. Thus section 704(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a)) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee "because he has made a charge, testified, as-
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing under this subchapter." 79
As it did in defining the protected activities under section
2302(b)(8), the Board construed the CSRA broadly in determining
whether the activities qualified for protection from reprisal.
Turning to the merits of the reprisal allegations based on equal
employment opportunities activities, the Board found a violation
concerning one of the employees.8 0 To correct the violation, the
74. Id. at 193.
75. Id. at 193-94. By adopting this four-part test for reprisal, the Board implicitly recog-
nized a distinction between the statutory protections of protected activity under the CSRA
and the constitutional protections of first amendment activity. This four-part test did not
employ the interest-balancing element that is integral in constitutional analysis. See Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (adopting balancing test between interest of
teacher in commenting on matters of public concern and interest of state in promoting effi-
ciency of public services). Later court decisions would apply the interest-balancing test used
in first amendment cases in whistleblower-reprisal actions. See, e.g., Fiorillo v. Department of
Justice, 795 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff failed to meet public con-
cern prong of balancing test); Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R.
465, 470, 472 (1987) (holding that whether employee's speech addresses matter of public
concern, and is, therefore, protected, must be determined by content, form, and context of
statement); infra notes 207-10, 223-27 and accompanying text (discussing application of inter-
est-balancing test).
76. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 193 (1979).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 192-93.
79. Id. at 192-93 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 196. The Board concluded that the reassignment of deputy Frazier was a repri-
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Board permanently enjoined the employee's pending reassign-
ment.81 Consistent with its broad authority to address individual
and systemic merit system abuses, the Board also ordered the Mar-
shals Service to cease retaliating against the employee for his EEO
activities and directed the Marshals Service to correct noted EEO
problems in its Atlanta office. 82
Unlike employees adversely affected by decisions of the Board,
OSC lacks authority to appeal adverse Board decisions. 83 The em-
ployees who had intervened in the administrative proceeding did
appeal the Board's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.84 OSC's attempt to file an amicus curiae
brief in that appeal, however, was successfully opposed by the De-
sal for Frazier's long history of involvement in EEO activities. Id The Board found by pre-
ponderant evidence that the management review team considered Frazier's EEO complaints
in recommending his transfer. Ie Moreover, the Board found many instances in which Fra-
zier's supervisors in Atlanta had taken actions against him immediately after he had engaged
in protected EEO activities. Id. at 198. Because of the number of incidents of reprisal, the
Board inferred that the management team and Director Hall participated in the retaliation
against Frazier. Id. at 194-95.
81. Id. at 201.
82. Id. at 197-200.
83. Under the CSRA, OSC is without authority to litigate beyond the administrative
level. Id. at 168. Consequently, the only parties with a right to appeal the Frazier decision
were the four deputies who had intervened in OSC's case before the Board. Id. On numer-
ous occasions, OSC has asked Congress for the authority to appeal decisions of the Board in
which it is a party. See, e.g., Office of the Special Counsel, First Annual Report to the Congress
On the Activities of the Office of the Special Counsel 23 (1979); Office of the Special Counsel,
1980 Annual Report 31 (1980); Office of the Special Counsel, 1981 Annual Report 32-33
(1981). Recent proposed legislation would have granted OSC such litigation authority. See S.
508, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1212(d)(3), 134 CONG. REC. S15,328-37 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1988)
(Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988). However, that legislation was vetoed by President
Reagan. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1377 (Oct. 26, 1988) (outlining concerns about burden of proof
and constitutional issues in proposal bill); infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text (examin-
ing legislative initiatives). The recently enacted Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 con-
tains no litigation authority for OSC to appeal adverse decisions by the Board. Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.). This omission resulted from the compromise agreement which Con-
gress struck with the Bush Administration. 135 CONG. REc. 82780 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989)
(statement of Sen. C. Levin).
84. Under then existing law, the regional United States Court of Appeals had exclusive
jurisdiction to review final orders of the Board on the petition of an employee or applicant
adversely affected or aggrieved by a Board decision. See Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd.,
672 F.2d 150, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding § 7703 of CRSA and 28 U.S.C. § 2342 gave
court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to orders of Board). In 1982, Congress created the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96
Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). Under that Act, Congress gave the
Federal Circuit sole jurisdiction over employee appeals from final decisions by the Board in
nondiscrimination cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1988) (granting Federal Circuit exclu-
sive jurisdiction of appeal from final order or decision of Board); 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1988)
(granting any adversely affected employee right to appeal nondiscrimination Board decisions
to Federal Circuit), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 10, 103 Stat. 35 (cur-
rent version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703 (West Supp. 1990)).
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partment ofJustice and the Board, effectively precluding OSC from
further participation in the case.8 5 The court eventually upheld the
Board's decision on every issue affecting OSC prosecutions.8 6
II. THE BOARD ADOPTS THE MT. HEALTHY TEST
The next significant Board decision concerning reprisal for pro-
tected activity came in December 1981, in Gerlach v. Federal Trade
Commission.8 7 Gerlach arose through the Board's employee appeal
procedures8 8 after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had re-
moved Gerlach for alleged poor performance. Gerlach prevailed at
the initial decision stage where the Board's presiding official re-
versed the agency's action, finding that the agency had removed the
appellant in part for the grievance she had filed against her supervi-
sor.89 The agency petitioned the Board to review the initial deci-
sion, arguing that the presiding official's finding of reprisal had been
in error. 90 Because the case arose from the Board's appellate proce-
dures, OSC was not a party in the case.9 1
As a starting point, the Board succinctly recited the four-part test
for reprisal announced in Frazier.92 Applying this four-part test, the
Board "agree[d] with the presiding official's holding that the pro-
tected conduct was a significant factor in the decision to remove
appellant.1
93
Next, the Board confronted squarely the issue it had declined to
resolve in Frazier, namely, how to deal with a personnel action that
85. See Letter from Acting Special Counsel Mary 0. Eastwood to Solicitor General Wade
H. McCreeJr. (Mar. 11, 1980) (requesting permission to file amicus brief); Transmittal letter
from Ruth T. Prokop, Chairwoman, MSPB to Acting Special Counsel Mary 0. Eastwood (Mar.
20, 1980) (regarding Eastwood's request to Solicitor General); Letter from Ruth T. Prokop,
Chairwoman, MSPB to Solicitor General Wade H. McCreeJr. (Mar. 20, 1980) (opposing East-
wood's assertion of independent authority to request permission to file amicus brief); Decision
Memorandum by Solicitor General Wade H. McCreeJr. (Apr. 14, 1980) (denying Eastwood's
request to file amicus brief). Consequently, OSC was denied the opportunity to argue in oppo-
sition to the DOJ-MSPB argument.
86. Frazier, 672 F.2d at 170.
87. 9 M.S.P.R. 268 (1981).
88. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7701 (1988) (detailing procedures governing employee appeals of
adverse agency actions), amended by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 6, 103 Stat. 33
(current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7701 West 1980 & Supp. 1990)); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.1 1-
1201.119 (1990) (MSPB regulations governing same); cf. Procedures for Original jurisdiction
Cases, 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.121-1201.134 (1990) (outlining procedures governing originaljuris-
diction cases).
89. Gerlach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 268, 272 (1981).
90. Id. at 271.
91. Although OSC had the authority to intervene in the Gerlach appeal proceeding, it
chose not to do so. See 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (1988) (granting OSC authority to intervene in any
proceedings before Board), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103
Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(c) (West Supp. 1990)).
92. Gerlach, 9 M.S.P.R. at 272.
93. Id. at 273.
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may have been taken for both prohibited and legitimate reasons:
the so-called "dual motivation" or "mixed motive" case. The Board
expressed concern that, as a policy matter, it should not reverse ac-
tions unless the most important basis or real motivating factor for
the action was a prohibited personnel practice. 94 After reviewing
analogous areas of law for guidance, 95 the Board adopted the
Supreme Court's causation standard announced in Mt. Healthy96 for
use in dual motivation reprisal cases under the Board's appellate
jurisdiction.97 The Board paraphrased the Supreme Court's two-
part Mt. Healthy test as follows:
First, the employee has the burden of establishing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the protected conduct was a "sub-
stantial" or "motivating" factor. If the employee carries that
burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action
even if the protected conduct had not taken place.
98
The Board's purpose in adopting this test was to preclude demon-
strably incompetent employees from using their protected activities
to shield themselves from valid personnel actions.99 After consult-
ing the legislative history of the CSRA, the Board concluded that
Congress "sought to protect employees from prohibited personnel
practices, but at the same time not to insulate them from legitimate
conduct or performance-based adverse actions."' 10 0 Acknowledging
that it was not compelled to adopt the Mt. Healthy test, the Board
nevertheless concluded that it was the best available test for resolv-
ing the conflicting purposes of the CSRA in dual-motivation
cases. 101 The Board quoted a passage from Mt. Healthy which stated
that the test was not intended to preclude the "borderline" or "mar-
ginal" employee from being vindicated because of a protected
94. Id. at 273 n.5.
95. Id. at 276.
96. 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
97. See supra note 71 (presenting Mt. Healthy context and defense).
98. Gerlach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 268, 275 (1981).
99. Id. at 276.
100. Id. at 273 (reviewing S. REP. No. 696, supra note 5, at 22).
101. Id. at 276. The Board stated:
After careful review of the decision utilizing the Mt. Healthy test .... we have con-
cluded that it constitutes an approach which is inherently logical and totally consis-
tent with the Civil Service Reform Act and its legislative history. It presents a
coherent analytical framework for determining causality assuring that an employee
who may have engaged in protected activity is not thereby granted immunity from
the ordinary consequences of misconduct or poor performance and equitably allo-
cates the burdens of proof.
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activity.' 0
2
III. EXTENSION OF THE MT. HEALTHY TEST TO
OSC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
In 1981, while Gerlach was pending before the Board, OSC filed
two corrective action cases charging reprisal for protected activity,
Special Counsel ex rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State10 3 and Special
Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of the Army. 10 4 Rohrmann in-
volved the suspension and geographic reassignment of a passport
officer by the Department of State after the officer had written a se-
ries of memoranda to his supervisors, the Secretary of State, and the
President, accusing the State Department of incompetence and in-
difference in the management of its fraud detection program. 105 Af-
ter considering Rohrmann's removal, the State Department finally
imposed a fourteen-day suspension and reassigned him from New
York to Boston for failing to return fraud case files that he had re-
moved from his office in order to expose what he believed to be
mismanagement. 06
Mortensen involved the proposed removal of an Army chemist for
insubordination and unsatisfactory performance.107 An OSC inves-
tigation revealed reasonable grounds to believe that the Army
wanted to remove Mortensen because she had filed EEO complaints
against the Army and had made communications concerning the
Army's treatment of her outside EEO channels, activities protected
by section 2302(b)(8) and (9).108 In both Rohrmann and Mortensen,
the facts raised the possibility that management officials may have
acted out of a combination of legitimate and illegitimate motives.
The presence of dual or mixed motives prompted the Board in
Rohrmann and Mortensen to consider whether the Mt. Healthy test
adopted in Gerlach should be applied to cases brought by the Special
102. Id. at 275 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
285-86 (1976)).
103. 9 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982).
104. 16 M.S.P.R. 178 (1983).
105. Special Counsel exrel. Rohrmann v. Department ofState, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 365 (1982).
106. Id. at 366. Neither a 14-day suspension, nor a reassignment constitutes a personnel
action appealable directly to the Board. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7512-7513 (West 1980) (listing
personnel activities covered under direct appeal provisions). Under the CSRA, these actions
were reviewable by the Board only through an OSC corrective action. See 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1206(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (outlining cases reviewable by corrective action), repealed by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1212 (West Supp. 1990)).
107. Rohrmann, 9 M.S.P.R. at 367-71; Special Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of
the Army, 16 M.S.P.R. 178, 185 (1983).
108. Id. at 179-80.
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Counsel for corrective action. 109
The cases were assigned to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for a
recommended decision. Rohrmann was first to reach the Board for
final decision and was the case in which the Board decided to extend
the tests of Gerlach and Mt. Healthy to corrective action cases brought
by the Special Counsel. In Rohrmann, the ALJ found a prima facie
case of reprisal. 10 The ALJ, however, upheld the agency's action by
concluding that the agency would have taken the action regardless
of the employee's protected activity."' OSC filed exceptions to the
recommended decision, challenging the ALJ's application of the Mt.
Healthy test to deny corrective action." 2 Rohrmann went to the
Board for consideration prior to the issuance of the Gerlach deci-
sion. 113 The issue before the Board was a narrow one: whether, in
an action brought by OSC pursuant to its enforcement responsibili-
ties, an agency should be allowed to take a personnel action against
an employee whose protected activity was a significant factor in the
agency's action, when the agency would have taken the same action
for legitimate reasons.
Once again the Board confronted the fundamental conflict be-
tween the employee's right to engage in protected activity and the
agency's authority to manage its work force, with OSC advocating a
tilt toward employee rights. As a threshold matter, the Board found
in both Rohrmann and Mortensen that the personnel actions were mo-
tivated in significant part by protected activity sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of reprisal. 114 OSC argued that as a matter of
public policy, employees should be protected from adverse person-
nel actions once retaliatory animus had been shown to be a signifi-
cant factor in the action, even if this meant that some misconduct or
poor performance would be overlooked." 5 This was necessary,
109. Id. at 187.
110. Recommended Decision of the Administration Law Judge at 24-25, Special Counsel
ex reL Rohrmann v. Department of State, 4 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982) (finding sufficient evidence to
support inference that protected conduct was significant factor in adverse action).
I 11. Id. at 26 (concluding that because of insubordination, employee would have been
subject of adverse action even if he had not made his disclosures).
112. Exceptions to the Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge at 2-4,
Special Counsel ex rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982).
113. Special Counsel ex rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. at 367.
114. In Rohrmann, the Board found that the employee's protected activity, whistleblowing,
provided partial motivation for the disciplinary action. Special Counsel ix rel. Rohrmann v.
Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 366 (1982). In Mortensen, the Board found that the
employee's EEO complaints were causally connected to the decision to discipline. Special
Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16 M.P.S.R. 178, 184 n.9 (1983). In both
cases, the Board concluded that OSC had established a prima facie case of reprisal for pro-
tected activity.
115. Exceptions to the Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge at 3,
Special Counsel ex reL Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982); OSC Reply
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OSC asserted, because decisions motivated by both retaliatory and
legitimate reasons had a detrimental effect on the merit system.11 6
OSC reasoned that if promotion of protected activities like
whistleblowing was Congress' intent, retaliatory action should not
be condoned regardless of whether the agency had established an
alternative, legitimate motive for the decision." 7 OSC warned that,
if adopted, the Mt. Healthy test could invite agencies to engage in
post hoc rationalizations and make it more difficult for OSC to protect
employees from reprisal. 118
One of the practical dangers of adopting the Mt. Healthy test was
that the "could have" and "would have" distinction would easily
blur. Although the Mt. Healthy test required the employer to estab-
lish by preponderant evidence that it would have taken the same
action regardless of the employee's protected activity, in practice,
evidence that it could have taken the action would become the only
available means to meet circumstantially the "would have" burden,
absent unusual circumstances. 19
In fact, in December 1981, while Rohrmann and Mortensen were
pending before the Board, an MSPB presiding official, purportedly
applying the Gerlach-Mt. Healthy test, used a "could have" standard
in Spadaro v. Department of the Interior,120 a dual motivation employee-
appeal case. 121 In Spadaro, OSC exercised its independent interven-
tion authority in support of the employee who alleged that his
thirty-day suspension was a reprisal for whistleblowing. 122 The pre-
Brief for Petitioner at 2-4, Special Counsel e rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16
M.S.P.R. 178 (1983).
116. OSC Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2-6, Special Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Depart-
ment of Army, 16 M.S.P.R. 148 (1983).
117. Id. at 4.
118. Exceptions to the Recommended Decision of the Administrative LawJudge at 3-4,
Special Counsel ex rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982); OSC Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 14-16, Special Counsel ix rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16
M.S.P.R. 178 (1983).
119. In Mortensen, OSC objected to the application of Mt. Healthy on these grounds. OSC
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 27, Special Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16
M.S.P.R. 178 (1983) (asserting post hoc rationalization as to what agency might have done
absent improper motive is mere speculation). In his recommended decision to the Board, the
ALJ concluded that the Army would have taken the same action regardless of the employee's
protected conduct because "an organization cannot retain on its rol[l]s an insubordinate and
poor performing employee." Recommended Decision of the AdministrativeJudge at 26, Spe-
cial Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16 M.S.P.R. 178 (1983). Having found
that the employee had been insubordinate and a poor performer, the ALJ reasoned that the
action was justified. Id. at 18-26. Thus, proof that the employee had engaged in misconduct
and was a poor performer became sufficient to establish that the agency "would have" taken
the same action regardless of the protected activity.
120. 18 M.S.P.R. 462 (1983).
121. Spadaro v. Department of the Interior, 18 M.S.P.R. 462, 465 (1983).
122. The CSRA authorized OSC to intervene in any proceeding before the Board. 5
U.S.C.A. § 1206 (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat.
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siding official who heard the initial appeal applied Gerlach to con-
clude that a reprisal motivation had been a significant factor in the
decision to suspend.' 23 The presiding official, however, upheld the
suspension because he found that the agency could have imposed
the suspension for insubordination and misuse of a government tel-
ephone, as the agency had charged, even if the protected activity
had not occurred. 124 OSC asked the Board to reverse the presiding
official's decision, arguing that the standard was erroneous, and
urged the Board to instruct its presiding officials on the type and
quality of proof necessary to satisfy the "would have" standard
under the Mt. Healthy test.125 OSC expressed particular concern
that presiding officials and the Board would accept as dispositive the
self-serving statements of officials shown to have used prohibited
motives to influence their decisions.' 26 These officials were likely to
testify that they would have taken the same action regardless of
whether the employee engaged in the protected activity. 127
The Board in Spadaro ultimately rejected the presiding official's
interpretation of Mt. Healthy and concluded that the agency had not
established by preponderant evidence that it would have taken the
18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(c) (West Supp. 1990)). The Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989 has limited this authority. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990)
(detailing powers and functions of OSC concerning investigation and litigation of employee
claims). While the Senate Report acknowledged that the committee was not aware of any
instances in which the OSC had inappropriately intervened in employee appeals, Congress
acted to limit OSC intervention only with the consent of the individual initiating the action. S.
REP. No. 413, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1988). Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
101-12, 103 Stat. 16, 20 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990)) (pro-
viding that OSC may not intervene in action under section 1221 or appeal under section 7701
without consent of individual).
123. Spadaro, 18 M.S.P.R. at 465.
124. Id.
125. Brief for Special Counsel as Intervenor at 7, Spadaro v. Department of the Interior,
18 M.S.P.R. 462 (1983).
126. Id. at 5-6.
127. OSC wrote:
Under the circumstances any statements at the hearing by officials who took the
action must be viewed with extreme skepticism. By acting from personal vindictive-
ness, they have shown that they are "out to get" this employee and are willing to
bend the rules to achieve this goal. It is very easy indeed to claim that the action
would have been taken anyway. Who, after all, can dispute such an assertion? Yet
the claim must be recognized for what it is: pure conjecture as to what the agency
officials might have done had they not yielded to the temptation to use the personnel
power for petty, vindictive purposes. Aside from the ill will they clearly feel towards
the employee, the officials have additional reasons to shade the truth since a finding
of retaliatory conduct exposes them to disciplinary action by the Special Counsel.
It is respectfully suggested, therefore, that the Board hold as a matter of law that
the bald statements of agency officials cannot serve as a basis for finding that the
agency would have taken the action even absent the retaliatory motive. Rather, to
meet its burden under Gerlach, the agency must present objective evidence tending to
corroborate this claim, not evidence manufactured later to support the penalty.
Id. (citations omitted).
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same action absent the protected activity.1 28 Recognizing the
"highly individualized" nature of dual motivation cases, the Board
stated that the agency's burden was not merely to establish that it
could have taken the action, but that "this appellant, in this branch
of this agency, with its own history of disciplining employees for
similar infractions, would, in fact, have received the discipline im-
posed absent the protected conduct."' 129 The Board then listed sev-
eral examples of ways in which agencies might satisfy the "would
have" standard.' 3 0 This decision not only instructed the Board's
adjudicators on the proper application of the Mt. Healthy test, but
also signalled agencies that the Board would strictly review person-
nel decisions infected with consideration of protected conduct.' 3 '
In the OSC corrective action cases of Rohrmann and Mortensen, the
Board, spurred by its reasoning in Gerlach and the advocacy of OPM
and the agencies to apply Mt. Healthy in OSC correcti.ve actions, ulti-
mately adopted the Mt. Healthy standard over OSC's objection. 13 2
The Board relied on the legislative history of the CSRA to support
its assertion that the statute was not intended to protect employees
who engaged in misconduct. 33
128. Spadaro, 18 M.S.P.R. at 467.
129. Id. at 465.
130. The Board wrote:
mhe types of evidence which might serve to meet an agency's burden also will vary
with each case. For example, the agency might show that other employees who were
accused of the same or similar offenses but who had not engaged in protected activi-
ties were disciplined in a like manner. The agency could also demonstrate that a
table of penalties in use at the agency supports the discipline applied to the particu-
lar offense. In the case of problem behavior which is unique in the agency's experi-
ence, the agency might attempt to show that the particular behavior is of such a
serious nature that reasonable people could not differ with the conclusion that the
chosen discipline was necessary even if the prohibited motive did not exist....
Id. at 466.
131. One of the charges leveled against OSC during congressional hearings on the
Whisdeblower Protection Act was that OSC believed the Mt. Healthy "would have" standard
should be applied as a "could have" standard. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1986: Hearings
on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
99th Cong., Ist Sess. 103 (1986) (statement of Rep. P. Schroeder) (stating that burden of
proof under Mt. Healthy test is easier for employer than employee); Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Olice
and Civil Service, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1987) (statement of Thomas Devine, legal direc-
tor, Government Accountabilty Project) (stating that whistleblower will be inviting "Big
Brother" to find evidence supporting firing of employee to meet standard). As OSC's re-
ported intervention in support of the whistleblower-appellant in Spadaro demonstrated, the
OSC's position has been to oppose strongly any dilution of the "would have" standard.
132. Special Counsel ex rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 367 (1982);
Special Counsel ex rel. Mortensen v. Department of Army, 16 M.S.P.R. 178, 187 (1983).
133. The Board wrote:
Finally, it should be noted that this section is a prohibition against reprisals. The
section should not be construed as protecting an employee who is otherwise engaged in misconduct,
or who is incompetent, from appropriate disciplinary action. If, for example, an employee has
had several years of inadequate performance, or unsatisfactory performance ratings,
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Using the Mt. Healthy test, the Board easily upheld the actions
taken by the agencies in Rohmann and Morten.' 3 4 In both cases,
the agencies established that the employees had engaged in miscon-
duct warranting discipline.' 3 5 Having established this, the agencies
prevailed on the ultimate issue of whether they would have taken
the action regardless of the retaliatory animus by merely demon-
strating that the actions were otherwise justified.'3 6 Without access
to judicial review, OSC could not challenge the Board's decision to
apply Mt. Healthy in corrective action cases.' 3 7 Nevertheless, the
Board's clear directions in Spadaro on the application of the Mt.
Healthy test ensured that the doctrine would not be misconstrued to
or if an employee has engaged in action which would constitute dismissal for cause,
the fact the employee "blows the whistle" on his agency after the agency has begun
to initiate disciplinary action against the employee will not protect the employee
against such disciplinary action. Whether the disciplinary action is a result of the
individual's performance on the job, whether it is a reprisal because the employee
chose to criticize the agency, is a matter for judgement to be determined in the first
instance by the agency, and ultimately by the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems
Protection Board.
Rohrmann, 9 M.S.P.R. at 368-69 (citing S. REP. No. 969, supra note 5, at 22 (emphasis added)).
Explaining its intentions, the Board wrote:
Accordingly, we have decided, for reasons set forth herein, to adopt the Mt. Healthy
test for corrective action proceedings involving allegations of a violation of section
2302(b)(8). That test, as it will henceforth be applied in such cases, has two parts.
First, the Special Counsel has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the protected conduct was a "significant factor" in the challenged
agency action. If the Special Counsel meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
agency to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
same action regardless of the protected conduct. It is our intention that the Mt.
Healthy test must be used in corrective action proceedings just as it will be used in
appeals, i.e., as a method of allocating the burdens of proof and as an analytical tool
for determining ultimate causality, and not as a method of dictating the order of
presentation of evidence.
Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 371 (affirming ALJ's finding that action was motivated in part by employee's
insubordination); Mortensen, 16 M.S.P.R. at 187 (finding that Army had demonstrated legiti-
mate managerial reasons for its action).
135. Rohrmann, 9 M.S.P.R. at 366-67 (agreeing that employee's action constituted insub-
ordination); Mortensen, 16 M.S.P.R. at 190 (discussing agency's concerns with employee's in-
subordination and unsatisfactory job performance).
136. In Rohrmann, the agency proved conclusively that it would have taken the same action
regardless of the protected activity. Rohrmann, 9 M.S.P.R. at 371. In Mortensen, the Board
concluded that the employee's first-level supervisor, who was primarily responsible for pro-
posing the removal, had not acted out of retaliatory animus, but had acted for legitimate
reasons. Moriensen, 16 M.S.P.R. at 188. The Board ascribed reprisal motivation only to the
deciding official, who was the second-level supervisor. Id. Because the first-level supervisor
would have proposed removal regardless of the protected activity, the Board inferred that the
action would have been taken regardless of the second-level supervisor's animus since it was
the second-level supervisor's practice to support the decisions of the subordinate managers.
Id. at 191. Therefore, the Board found that the agency established a Mt. Healthy defense
notwithstanding its detection of retaliatory animus on the part of the deciding official. Id.
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 1207(c) (1988) (establishing no OSC administrative appeal from Board
order; only employee subject to disciplinary action may obtain judicial review under this pro-
vision), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8), 103 Star. 18 (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990)).
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the detriment of employees who engaged in protected whistleblow-
ing.13 8 Indeed, since the Board's clarification of the Mt. Healthy test
in Spadaro, OSC has encountered little resistance from agencies in
response to OSC requests for corrective action in individual cases.
This, in turn, has produced a significant improvement in OSC's suc-
cess rate at obtaining relief for victims of reprisal and other prohib-
ited personnel practices. 39
IV. DISCIPLINARY ACTION CASES AND THE MT. HEALTHY TEST
Special Counsel v. Cummings 140 was the first case prosecuted by OSC
for disciplinary action of a supervisor because of reprisal for pro-
tected activity. OSC alleged that Cummings, a Regional Adminis-
trator for the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), reassigned two employees in reprisal for disclosures made
prior to Cummings' appointment. 14 1 Before going to HUD, Cum-
mings had been a management agent for a HUD-insured non-profit
housing project. 142 The disclosures were of particular significance
138. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing Spadaro discussion of ex-
amples of why agencies could satisfy "would have" standard, and strong signal Board sent
agencies on personnel decision in retaliation for protected conduct).
139. Under the CSRA, agency heads and subordinate officials with delegated personnel
management authority are responsible for preventing prohibited personnel practices and en-
forcing civil service laws, rules, and regulations. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(c) (1988), amended by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 4, 103 Stat. 32 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 2302(c) (West Supp. 1990)). This statutory responsibility and OSC's demonstrated willing-
ness to litigate prohibited personnel practices have resulted in an increasing number of volun-
tary corrective actions from agencies upon request without resort to formal litigation. During
fiscal 1986, five matters were settled by OSC and the agency prior to the initiation of formal
action. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov't Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988: Hearings on
H.R. 2907 Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov't of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1988) (statement of Mary F. Wiesemen, Special
Counsel of Board); see also id. at 161-63 (discussing OSC internal corrective actions obtained
as of March 2, 1987). During fiscal year 1988, OS was involved in 33 corrective actions.
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov't Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov't of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 10 1st
Cong., 1st Sess. 463 (1989) (statement of Mary F. Wiesemen, Special Counsel of Board)
(presenting preliminary figures pending completion of annual report to Congress). During
fiscal year 1987, Special Counsel Mary F. Wiesemen achieved 38 corrective actions through
this referral-negotiation process. Office of Special Counsel, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL FISCAL YEAR 1987 10 (1988). Similarly, during his ten-
ure, former Special Counsel K. William O'Connor testified before a congressional subcom-
mittee that he had found no reason to file corrective actions with the Board because
"corrective action ha[d] been secured by agency action responsive to OS requests."
Whistleblower Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 240 (1985) (statement of K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel) [hereinafter Whistleblower Protection Hearings].
140. 20 M.S.P.R. 625 (1984). Cummings was filed May 18, 1982, by Special Counsel Alex
Kozinski, the first Special Counsel to be confirmed by the Senate. 127 CONG. REc. 11,125
(1988). Mr. Kozinski was succeeded in October, 1982, by K. William O'Connor. 128 CONG.
REc. 25,930 (1982).
141. Special Counsel v. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R. 625, 627 (1984).
142. Id. at 628.
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to Cummings because they contained information which opposed
his use of tenant security deposits to repay debts incurred through
repairs on property under his management.1 43 In addition, the dis-
closures led to the cancellation of HUD contracts with two associ-
ates of Cummings.'
44
In Cummings, OSC, for the first time, departed from its opposition
to the Mt. Healthy test and supported its extension to OSC discipli-
nary actions. 145 The Board, however, found it unnecessary to reach
that issue, holding that OSC had failed to establish a prima facie
case that the reassignments had been taken in reprisal for protected
activity.' 46 In making its determination, the Board issued only a
brief decision, adopting the administrative law judge's recom-
mended decision in the case.
147
In August 1983, OSC filed a series of disciplinary actions charging
federal officials at various agencies with reprisal for protected activ-
ity. The first, Special Counsel v. Hoban,'48 eventually became OSC's
first contested disciplinary action for reprisal to result in the Board's
143. Id.
144. Post-Hearing Brief of Petitioner at 9-13, Special Counsel v. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R.
625 (1984).
145. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R. at 629; see also Post Hearing Brief for Petitioner at 6, Special
Counsel v. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R. 625 (1984) (stating "[a]pplication of the Mt. Healthy stan-
dard seems entirely apposite to disciplinary action proceedings"). OSC briefs in the case do
not explain the reason for the shift. It is evident from the briefs submitted that OSC believed
there was no legitimate justification for Cummings' actions and therefore believed that, even
under the Mt. Healthy test, the Board would find that reprisal had occurred, regardless of what
standard was employed. Id. at 6-8. In support of its case, OSC presented evidence that prior
to Cummings' appointment, the employees had supported positions which were injurious to
the economic interests of Cummings and his friends. Id. at 9-13. OSC also presented evi-
dence that after his appointment, Cummings had made derogatory statements about the two
employees; that Cummings used unusual procedures to effect the actions; that Cummings
specifically had the positions created for the employees; and that there was a greater need for
the employees' services in their former positions. Id. at 14-26. This evidence, however, per-
suaded only one of the three Board members that the reassignments had been taken in repri-
sal for protected activity. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R. at 656 (Board Member Devaney, dissenting).
Upon examining the "evidentiary context," Board Member Devaney concluded in his dissent
that the uncontroverted facts supported the testimony of one of Cummings' top advisors that
Cummings had been out to get the two employees for what they had done to him when he had
been in private business. Id. at 655-56.
At the time OSC urged the application of Mt. Healthy in Cummings, K. William O'Connor
had recently been appointed Special Counsel. K. William O'Connor was confirmed in Octo-
ber, 1982. 128 CONG. REC. 25,930 (1982). In subsequent cases filed by Special Counsel
O'Connor, OSC renewed its opposition to the M. Healthy defense. See infra notes 151 & 154
and accompanying text (discussing OSC advocacy for "any part" test). In this context, OSC's
support for the Mt. Healthy test in Cummings must be viewed as an aberration.
146. Cummings, 20 M.S.P.R. at 626-27 (1984). Because it concluded that Cummings did not
involve reprisal motivation, the Board held that the question of whether to apply Mt. Healthy
and Gerlach to OSC disciplinary actions was not before it. Id. at 627 n.2. The Board specifi-
cally reserved that question for a case involving dual motivations. Id.
147. Id. at 627.
148. 24 M.S.P.R. 154 (1984).
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imposition of sanctions against a retaliating official.149 The Board's
decision in Hoban failed to reach the Mt. Healthy issue, however,150
and did not alter the existing status of reprisal law.'15 Nor did it
indicate what the Board's position on the Mt. Healthy issue might be
in a disciplinary action reprisal case.
With the filing of two more disciplinary cases charging reprisal for
protected activity, Special Counsel v. Harvey 152 and Special Counsel v.
Starrett, 5 3 OSC successfully placed before the Board the issue of
what test for reprisal would be used in disciplinary actions. In both
cases, OSC argued for the adoption of an "any part" test.
154
149. Special Counsel v. Hoban, 24 M.S.P.R. 154, 161-62 (1984). In Hoban, OSC charged
a Veterans Administration Chief of Police with having changed the duties of a subordinate in
reprisal for the subordinate's disclosure of information evidencing mismanagement. Id. at
155-56. The reprisal charged was sustained both by the administrative law judge and the
Board. Id. at 156.
150. The Board's only discussion in Hoban of substantive law in the reprisal area con-
cerned the standard to be used in determining whether a disclosure qualified for protection.
Id. at 160. In this regard, the Board agreed with the position advanced by OSC and reaf-
firmed its previous position that the discloser need only reasonably believe that the informa-
tion he or she is disclosing constitutes one of the conditions in section 2302(b)(8) in order to
qualify for protection. Id. It specifically rejected the notion that the information reported
must establish one of the conditions to qualify for protection. Id. The Board wrote, "The
whistleblower's evidence must show that 'a reasonable person in the employee's position
would believe' that the matter reported was protected by [section] 2302(b)(8)." Id.
151. OSC took the position in Hoban that the Mt. Healthy defense was not appropriate in a
disciplinary case because it would have the effect of condoning the retaliatory actions of the
accused official in dual motivation cases where the official could successfully muster a M.
Healthy defense. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Proposed
Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4-5, Special Counsel v. Hoban, 24 M.S.P.R. 154
(1984). Rather, OSC argued for the adoption of the "any part" test, its original position in
Frazier. Id. at 4-6; see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing OSC's proposal of
"any part" test),
152. 28 M.S.P.R. 595 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Harvey v. M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir.
1986). On August 24, 1983, OSC filed a five-count disciplinary complaint in Harvey. Com-
plaint for Disciplinary Action, Special Counsel v. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. 595 (1984). The com-
plaint charged the Assistant Inspector General for the Department of Energy with, inter alia,
recommending the geographic reassignment of a subordinate member of the Senior Execu-
tive Service in reprisal for that official's having disclosed information, which he reasonably
believed evidenced abuse of authority, waste, and mismanagement in the Office of the Inspec-
tor General, to congressional investigators, a White House staff member, and OSC. Id. at 9-
10.
153. 28 M.S.P.R. 60 (1985). On August 31, 1983, OSC filed a four-count disciplinary
complaint against three high-ranking officials of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA),
including the agency's Director, charging that the officials denied a subordinate auditor a
waiver of the agency's rotation policy and geographically reassigned him in reprisal for the
auditor's having disclosed to the media information which he reasonably believed evidenced a
gross waste of funds. Complaint for Disciplinary Action, Special Counsel v. Starrett at 6-7, 28
M.S.P.R. 60 (1985). A fourth DCAA official was also charged in the original complaint with
having retaliated against the auditor in reprisal for the auditor's having filed an EEO com-
plaint. Id. at 4. That case was severed from the main case and was decided onJune 21, 1985.
Special Counsel v. Brown, 28 M.S.P.R. 133, 134-35 n.1 (1985).
154. Post Hearing Brief for Petitioner at 20-22, Special Counsel v. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R.
595 (1984); Post Hearing Brief in Support of Complaint at 64, Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28
M.S.P.R. 60 (1985). Then Special Counsel O'Connor explained the decision to press for the
"any part" test before the House oversight committee:
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Harvey was the first of the two cases to be decided.155 In addition
to sustaining the allegations of reprisal and imposing disciplinary
measures against the supervisor, the Board made two significant rul-
ings in Harve which promoted OSC's enforcement of the CSRA's
reprisal protections. First, the Board agreed with OSC that a draft
of a letter, an unsent appeal for help addressed to OSC, constituted
protected activity. 156 The Board held that even though OSC could
not establish that Harvey knew at the time of the reprisal that the
employee had sent the letter to OSC, the fact that he had knowledge
of the employee's intention to send it was sufficient to protect the
employee from reprisal for having written the letter.' 57
Next, the Board rejected the Mt. Healthy defense in OSC discipli-
nary actions.' 58 In doing so, the Board endorsed OSC's argument
that disciplinary actions did not involve the same concerns that had
prompted the Board to adopt Mt. Healthy in corrective actions.1 59
The Board noted that in Gerlach, Rohrmann, and Mortensen, it had
been concerned with the prospect that failure to apply the Mt.
Healthy defense might result in possible unjust enrichment for em-
ployees whose conduct or performance justified the actions taken
against them.' 60 In the Board's view, disciplinary cases did not
present the same concern.' 6' The Board wrote:
[O]ur concern here is not whether the actions taken against [the
employee] were effected on legitimate grounds, would have been
taken despite protected activity, and should be allowed to stand.
Our concern in a disciplinary action ... is whether a respondent
My view of the law is this -. . . if there is a whiff of reprisal in an action, then that
action ought to be the basis for discipline and that person who was the subject of that
reprisal ought to be restored. But that is not the law. The law is a significant factor.
If you make the law say if there is [a] whiff of reprisal even the most de minimis, then
that will change the mix a great deal. But that is not the law. The law is as it is
interpreted in the courts and it is a significant factor.
Whistleblower Protection Hearings, supra note 139, at 260-61 (statement of K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel).
155. The Board issued its decision in Harvey on December 6, 1984. Special Counsel v.
Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. 595 (1984), revd sub nom. 802 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Starrett was
decided on June 13, 1985. Special Counsel v. Starrett, 29 M.S.P.R. 60 (1985), rev'd, 792 F.2d
1246 (4th Cir. 1986).
156. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 605.
157. Id. Because the Board found that the employee's activities were protected by sec-
tions 2302(b)(9) (covering exercise of appeal rights) and 2302(b)(10) (addressing conduct not
related to performance), it did not analyze the case under section 2302(b)(8) (whistleblow-
ing). Id. at 604 n.16.
158. Id. at 609. The Board held that its rejection of Mi. Healthy would apply to all discipli-
nary actions for reprisal under the statute. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see supra notes 94-102, 114-19, 133-39 and accompanying text (noting Board's
purpose in adopting Mt. Healthy test to preclude employees from hiding behind shield of
protected activity).
161. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 609.
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should escape discipline for a prohibited personnel practice even
if there is a lawful reason for taking the personnel action.162
The Board observed that the absence of the concern about unjust
enrichment removed the basic premise for the adoption of the M.
Healthy defense in corrective actions.
163
However, the Board refused to adopt the "any part" test ad-
vanced by OSC. Instead, the Board employed the significant factor
standard that it had been using in various incarnations since Fra-
zier:164 a prohibited causal connection is established if the protected
activity is a significant factor in the decision to take the action. 165
The Board in Harvey announced its rejection of the Mt. Healthy
defense for all OSC disciplinary actions in a separate portion of its
decision discussing discrimination based on the employee's per-
formance of his duties, 166 activity prohibited by section 2302 (b) (10)
of the statute. Consequently, the Board's rejection of the Mt.
Healthy test and adoption of the significant factor test for all forms of
prohibited reprisal was dicta.167 The Board later applied this signifi-
cant factor test to section 2302(b)(8) whistleblower reprisals in Star-
rett. s6 8 In Starrett, the Board held that three Defense Contract Audit
162. Id. In fact, the employee-victims in Harvey and Starrett obtained relief without OSC
having to file formal corrective actions on their behalf. Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1987:
Hearings on S. 508 Before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Sen.
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1987) (statement of Mary F. Wieseman,
Special Counsel of Board). In Starrett, OSC obtained two stays of the proposed geographic
reassignment from the MSPB. Id. The reassignment was first stayed temporarily by the
Board and later voluntarily delayed by DCAA. Id. At OSC's request, Defense Secretary Cas-
par Weinberger took steps to prevent the employee's reassignment. Id. Prior to the comple-
tion of the Board's disciplinary proceedings, and in response to the Special Counsel's request,
the agency rescinded its decision to reassign the whistleblower. In Harvey, the employee-
victim voluntarily transferred to another agency before the disciplinary action had been filed.
Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 598.
163. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 609.
164. See, e.g., Gerlach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 272, 274-77 (1981) (noting that appellant must
demonstrate that protected conduct was "substantial" factor in personnel decision) (citing
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86, 287 (1977)); Special Counsel ex
reL Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 371 (1982) (establishing that protected
activity must be "significant factor" in challenged action) (citing M. Healthy City School Dist.,
429 U.S. at 285-86); Spadaro v. Department of Interior, 18 M.S.P.R. 462, 464 (1983) (apply-
ing Mt. Healthy test); Peedin v. Department of Navy, 23 M.S.P.R. 549, 552 (1984) (noting that
Board's finding of no reprisal for protected activity not determinative of whether reprisal was
motivating or substantial factor in agency's subsequent removal of appellant for different
charges); Chandler v. Department of Treasury, 13 M.S.P.R. 90, 95 (1982) (noting that while
employer rebutted this presumption by showing action would have been taken anyway, pro-
tected activity was substantial or motivating factor in agency's subsequent removal) (citing
Gerlach, 9 M.S.P.R. at 276).
165. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 604 n.17 (citing In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 163 (1979) rev'd,
792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also Special Counsel v. Zimmerman, 36 M.S.P.R. 274, 305-
06 (1988) (discussing development of legal framework applicable to cases of alleged reprisal
under section 2302(b)(9)).
166. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 609.
167. Id.
168. Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R. 60, 66 (1985) (citing In re Frazier, I M.S.P.R.
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Agency (DCAA) officials, including the Director, had committed the
prohibited personnel practice of reprisal for whistleblowing.169
Significantly, the Board in Harvey analogized the alleged section
2302(b) (9) violation to prohibited retaliation based on the filing of a
discrimination complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.170 The Board cited approvingly a federal district court deci-,
sion which had imposed a presumption of reprisal in a Title VII re-
taliation case where the natural consequence of the personnel action
was to discourage the protected activity. That court created a pre-
sumption that an employer intended to discourage employees from
exercising their Title VII rights when retaliation occurred. 71 Find-
ing that the personnel action was "based" in significant part on pro-
tected activity, the Board held that reprisal had occurred. 172 In this
manner, the Board construed the antireprisal statute as if it were an
antidiscrimination statute.' 73
With victories in Hoban, Harvey, and Starrett, OSC appeared to be
163, 163, rev'd, 792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986)). In Starrett, the Board proclaimed that the
significant factor test it was applying was consistent with the test it had applied in Frazier:
Where protected whistleblowing activity plays a significant role in the decision to
take a personnel action against an employee, section 2302(b)(8) has been violated.
We have held in In re Frazier,... that a prohibited personnel practice has been com-
mitted under section 2302(b)(9) if the protected activity is a significant factor in the
decision to take a personnel action, adverse to the interests of an employee, or appli-
cant for employment, who has exercised an appeal right granted by law. That same
rule applies, under section 2302(b)(8), to protected disclosures of whistleblowers.
Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id at 69-70. In a severed case, the Board followed the course it established in Harvey
and held that the "significant factor" test was the proper standard to apply in disciplinary
actions for reprisal under section 2302(b)(9) for the exercise of an appeal right. Special
Counsel v. Brown, 28 M.S.P.R. 133, 137-38 (1985). However, on the merits, the Board con-
cluded that the protected activity, giving testimony at an MSPB hearing, was not a significant
factor in the challenged action, an accelerated geographic reassignment out of the region. Id.
at 140. The Board held that although the official considered the employee's testimony criti-
cizing DCAA management in making the decision to reassign, it was the mutual mistrust and
strained personal relations between the employee and the regional supervisors, of which the
employee's testimony was only a small manifestation, that actually motivated the decision. Id.
at 139. Moreover, the Board noted several actions by the official that were inconsistent with a
retaliatory motive, such as the official's attempt to accommodate the employee's inability to fly
by assigning him to a region which minimized flight travel. Id.
170. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at 605.
171. The Board quoted:
Specific evidence of intent to discriminate is not an indispensable element of proof of
violation of Section 704(a).... [A]n employer's protestation that it did not intend to
discriminate is unavailing where a natural consequence of its action was such dis-
couragement toward employees from exercising their rights under Title VII. Con-
cluding that employees' discouragement from exercising their rights will result from
acts of retaliation, it is presumed that the employer intended such consequences.
Id at 605-06 (quoting Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114, 129 (D.
Minn. 1977) (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
172. Id. at 606.
173. Id at 605 (writing that "circumstances of this case bear a similarity to proof of the
element of intent in discrimination cases").
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on its way to establishing a viable enforcement program. 174 The
Board decisions in those cases increased the likelihood that OSC
would prevail in future reprisal cases. As in Frazier, the Board ex-
plicitly acknowledged that reprisal could be established by inference
where a significant causal connection between the protected activity
and the challenged action existed. 175
V. REVIEW BY THE COURTS
The disciplined officials in Harvey and Starrett appealed their
Board decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, respectively.1 76 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit
and the Fourth Circuit reversed Harvey's demotion and Starrett's
removal, respectively.1 77 Starrett was decided first.' 78 In that deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit overturned the Board's disciplinary sanc-
174. In Hoban, the Board ordered the offending official's demotion from GS-9, Chief of
Police, to GS-5, Step 1, Police Officer. Special Counsel v. Hoban, 24 M.S.P.R. 154, 162
(1984). In Harvey, the Board ordered the offending official's demotion from the Senior Exec-
utive Service to a nonmanagerial GS-14 position, for a period of three years from the date of
demotion. Special Counsel v. Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. 605, 611 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Harvey v.
M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Starrett, the Board ordered Director Starrett's
removal from federal service and fined him $1,000. Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R.
65, 75 (1985), rev'd, Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986). It also or-
dered the demotion of two subordinate managers to nonsupervisory positions one grade be-
low their previous grade for a minimum period of three years and fined them each $500. Id.
175. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R. at 70-71 n.7 (stating that law guarantees that protected disclo-
sures may not be a significant factor in decision to take adverse action); Harvey, 28 M.S.P.R. at
604 n. 17 (stating proof of causal connection is prima facie showing of retaliation); Hoban, 24
M.S.P.R. at 160 (noting that all evidence taken together led to conclusion that reprisal had
occurred).
176. Harvey v. M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792
F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986). Under the CSRA, employees in an OSC disciplinary action had the
right to appeal the Board's final order imposing discipline to the United States court of ap-
peals for the judicial circuit in which the employee resided or was employed at the time of the
action. 5 U.S.C. § 1207(c) (1988), repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, § 3(a)(8),
103 Stat. 18 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990) (delineating right
to appeal final order to United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)).
177. Harvey, 802 F.2d at 552; Starrett, 792 F.2d at 1255. The Eleventh Circuit appeal was
mooted by the Board's own dismissal of the disciplinary actions against Starrett's subordinate
managers after receiving the Fourth Circuit's decision. Special Counsel v. Starrett, 30
M.S.P.R. 424 (1986).
178. Starrett, 792 F.2d at 1246. Although the caption of the case listed the Special Coun-
sel as the respondent and the decision referred to the Special Counsel as the responding
party, id. at 1246, in fact, pursuant to statute, the Board, as the administrative body responsi-
ble for the decision, was the responding party. 5 U.S.C. § 1205(h) (1988) (authorizing Board
to represent itself in civil actions brought in connection with its functions under Title V with
exception of litigation in Supreme Court), amended by and renumbered by Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989, § 3(7)(F), 103 Stat. 17 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1204(i) (West Supp.
1990)). Just as Congress had given OSC no authority to appeal an adverse decision by the
Board, it had given OSC no authority to defend a favorable decision of the Board in the
United States courts of appeals. Id. § 1206, repealed by Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 19 (current version at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (West Supp. 1990)).
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tions for Director Starrett on the facts. 179 Although the court
agreed with the Board that Starrett had "considered" protected ac-
tivity in making his decision to deny the employee's request for a
waiver of the agency's rotation policy, the court held that such con-
sideration did not establish improper retaliatory motive.180 The
court noted that "[t]here is simply no evidence that Starrett had im-
proper motives or that [the employee's] whistleblowing, qua
whistleblowing, entered into his decision not to grant [the em-
ployee] a waiver to DCAA policy."'' Thus, the court's decision
turned on insufficient proof of subjective retaliatory motivation.
Although the court's decision in Starrett turned on the facts of that
particular case, it revealed an unwillingness to infer retaliatory moti-
vation from the established causal connection between the pro-
tected activity and the personnel action. Thus, the court's approach
was at odds with the Board's observations in Frazier that "[retalia-
tory] motive must in almost all situations be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence." 182
In Harvey, the D.C. Circuit also reversed key factual determina-
tions that had formed the bases for the Board's findings of prohib-
ited personnel practices, including reprisal for protected activity.' 83
In doing so, the court rejected the Board's finding of fact that repri-
sal had been established through the existence of a causal connec-
tion between the protected activity and the personnel actions.' 8 4
Citing Starrett, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the notion that considera-
tion of protected activity in the course of making a management de-
cision was not alone sufficient to establish the particular retaliatory
motivation which Congress intended to proscribe.'8 5 The court
wrote:
Harvey's action in not recommending [the employee] for the SES
opening was not in retaliation for [the employee's] exercise of his
appeal rights or an attempt to deter him from exercising those
rights, but was a management decision about [the employee's]
qualifications, both technical and personal. To be sure, that man-
179. Starrett, 792 F.2d at 1255.
180. Id at 1254.
181. Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original).
182. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 194 (1979).
183. Harvey v. M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
184. Id. On this issue the court stated:
We need not, today, define the precise contours of a claim of retaliatory conduct on
the part of a supervisor. We need only observe that previously we have decided that
retaliation is to be defined broadly to include any action designed to punish an employee
for exercising his protected rights or to deter him from exercising those rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 548 (citing Starrett, 792 F.2d at 1246).
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agement decision was based on an opinion that Harvey formu-
lated of [the employee] based in part on [the employee's]
allegations in his draft complaint [to the Special Counsel] and his
efforts to use the draft to preserve his job. In that regard, of
course, there is some link between Harvey's actions and [the em-
ployee's] protected conduct. But it is not the type of prohibited
link covered by the Act.... Formulating an adverse opinion of an
employee, based upon what he has written and thereby not rec-
ommending him for certain jobs, is not the same as taking action
against an employee in an attempt to thwart his exercise of his
protected rights. If it were, it would mean that one in an execu-
tive position can never exercise his considered judgment in mak-
ing personnel recommendations when asked to do so when that
judgment is based on anything even tangentially related to the ex-
ercise of protected conduct.
186
Unstated, but nevertheless at the heart of these two appellate
court decisions, was the courts' predilection to uphold federal man-
agers' "business judgments," even where such judgments are
proven to be significantly linked to protected activity. This is clear
from the courts' criticism of the significant factor test. The Fourth
Circuit wrote:
We observe that such difference, [between corrective action and
disciplinary cases] valid as it may be in some contexts, may not
support the use of a standard of causation which inadequately
protects personnel, like Starrett, who are forced to make scores of
personnel decisions which may peripherally or incidentally in-
volve situations where employees have engaged in protected prac-
tice. The Act was designed to prohibit retaliation or reprisals by
personnel because of improper consideration of protected actions.
The standard of proof used must insure that the motivation for the
adverse action was an improper one. There is no support in the
legislative history of the Act for any particular standard of causa-
tion, but the standard used by the Board for any action under the
Act ... . must not be so loose or weak as to punish those not moti-
vated by improper purposes. 187
These decisions are more likely to discourage, rather than to en-
courage, whistleblowing and other protected activities by their en-
dorsement of adverse management decisions that are based
significantly on protected activity. For the courts to remove such
decisions from the reach of the law because the official purportedly
believed he or she was acting for legitimate purposes undermines
186. Id. (citations omitted).
187. Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1253 n.12 (4th Cir. 1986) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Harvey v. M.S.P.B., 802 F.2d 537, 548 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Starrett).
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the plainly stated whistleblower protections of the CSRA. s8s Prior
to Harvey and Starrett, it had not been apparent that supervisors, who
acted to the disadvantage of an employee based in significant part
on that employee's protected conduct, could successfully defend
their decisions by arguing that they thought they were acting
"reasonably."189
VI. BOARD REACTION TO UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS DECISIONS
The judicial rejection of the Board's factual conclusions in Starrett
and Harvey was not an endorsement of the Board's more expansive
view of reprisal. The Board's reaction to the appellate decisions
would be crucial to OSC's prospects for bringing successful discipli-
nary and corrective actions based on reprisal for protected activity.
In Special Counsel v. Mongan,190 a disciplinary case filed prior to and
decided after Harvey and Starrett, the Board applied the significant
factor test in spite of the reservations of the D.C. Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit. 19 ' The Board, however, displayed sensitivity to
those concerns by specifically noting that if it had applied Mt.
Healthy to the facts of Mongan, it would have found the defense un-
availing. 192 In Special Counsel v. Zimmerman,193 another disciplinary
188. See infra notes 234-38 (discussing conflict and court's effort to balance two distinct
policies of CSRA-to promote and encourage disclosure of waste, fraud, abuse of authority
and mismanagement and to promote management discretionary authority to eliminate
inefficiency).
189. A test based on the individual motivation of the manager is inherently problematic.
See Yudof, Personal Speech and Government Expression, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 696-97
(1987-88) (discussing problems with motivation tests). First, the natural inclination when an-
alyzing a management decision, both from the public's perspective and from a managerial
perspective, is not to focus on why the decision was made, but rather on what the decision
was. Motivation tests run counter to this inclination. Second, even when, as here, the law
requires that the inquiry focus on why the decision was made, that inquiry is inherently a
difficult one to undertake for a number of reasons. Probing the motivations of individuals
does not lend itself to exactitude. Personnel actions may be taken for a number of conflicting
reasons, and may be the product of different individuals. Those responsible for a particular
decision may disagree among themselves about the reasons for the decision. Even after all
relevant documents are reviewed and material witnesses interviewed, the history of the action
may remain unclear. Finally, individual managers may choose not to reveal or to lie about
their motivations.
190. 33 M.S.P.R. 392 (1987).
191. The complaint in Mongan was filed November 25, 1985, prior to the circuit court
decisions in Starrett and Harvey, which were decidedJune 5, and October 7, 1986, respectively,
Starrett, 792 F.2d at 1246; Harvey, 802 F.2d at 537.
192. Special Counsel v. Mongan, 33 M.S.P.R. 392, 396 (1987) (noting after independent
review that respondent did not establish by preponderant evidence that he would have denied
promotion anyway). Mongan, a regional administrator for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), refused to approve the promotion of his former secretary in
reprisal for her disclosures to HUD's Regional Inspector General for Investigations (RIGI)
during an investigation into the propriety of a HUD award. In the course of the investigation,
RIGI examined whether a former official had violated 18 U.S.C. § 207(g) by communicating
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case filed prior to and decided after Harvey and Starrett, the Board
again applied the significant factor test to find reprisal based on the
filing of an EEO complaint.' 94 In a footnote, the Board again
stated, in deference to the Fourth Circuit's concerns in Starrett, that
it would have reached the same conclusion under Mt. Healthy. 195
VII. RESTATEMENT OF THE GERLACH-MT. HEALTHY TEST
While the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit were reviewing the
Board's rulings in Harvey and Starrett, the Federal Circuit embarked
on a restatement of the elements of a reprisal case. Development of
the Federal Circuit standard occurred in the Board's appellate juris-
diction cases without input from OSC. 196 Under the Federal Circuit
standard as articulated in Warren v. Department of the Army, 1 9 7 the
party claiming reprisal must establish that: (1) a protected disclo-
sure was made; (2) the accused official knew of the claimant's disclo-
sure; (3) the adverse action under review could, under the
circumstances, have been retaliation; and (4) after careful balancing
of the intensity of the motive to retaliate against the gravity of em-
ployee misconduct or poor performance, a nexus is established be-
tween the adverse action and the motive. 198
In Warren, the Federal Circuit noted that the four elements were
drawn verbatim from Hagmeyer v. Department of Treasury 199 and that
the authority for them was Frazier.200 In describing this approach to
reprisal cases, the court in Warren stated that:
The wording there found [in Frazier], though different, in essence
is the same, but more elaborate and analytical, which was to be
with HUD employees concerning the grant. The secretary had told investigators that Mongan
had spoken with the former HUD official several times since the official's return to the private
sector. Id. at 394. Mongan asserted that his decision not to approve the promotion stemmed
from his belief that the employee could not be trusted with confidential information, and from
his adherence to an agency policy limiting the number of positions at the grade of the pro-
posed promotion. Id. at 396. After the completion of the disciplinary action, OSC obtained
corrective action for the secretary through agreement with the agency.
193. 36 M.S.P.R. 274 (1988). Zimmerman involved religious discrimination prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the counts charged Zimmerman with a host
of retaliatory actions after being informed that the employee intended to file an EEO com-
plaint against him. Special Counsel v. Zimmerman, 36 M.S.P.R. 274, 279 (1988).
194. Id. at 289.
195. Id. at 292 n.15 (noting that even under more stringent Mt. Healthy test, employee's
protected activity was still motivating factor).
196. See Sullivan v. Department of Navy, 720 F.2d 1266, 1276 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
that since 1982, Federal Circuit has had exclusive jurisdiction to hear nondiscrimination ap-
peals of Board decisions by federal employees) (citing Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1988)).
197. 804 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
198. Warren v. Department of Army, 804 F.2d 654, 657-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
199. 757 F.2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
200. Warren, 804 F.2d at 657.
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expected as the Board was writing on a clean slate in interpreting
a statute then new. The conclusion must follow that this court in
...Hagmeyer was not undertaking to reassign to the four tests
exactly the tasks they were to perform, but simply to identify them
so the employee's success in invoking them could be ticked off
and weighed according to Frazier.
20 1
Contrary to the court's assertion, part four of the Warren test de-
parted from the Board's decisions in Frazier and Gerlach. The Fed-
eral Circuit's new test required the Board to refocus the inquiry
from the search for the significance of the protected activity in the
challenged personnel action to the balancing of competing interests
which were defined, respectively, as evidence of an employer's spe-
cific motive to retaliate and evidence of the gravity of the
whistleblower's alleged misconduct. Under Warren, the court would
find a prohibited nexus only if the whistleblower could prove that
the intensity of the motive to retaliate against him was greater than
the seriousness of his alleged misconduct. Thus, the court intro-
duced in mid-decade a new analytical approach to the developing
body of administrative law.
In addition to this restatement, the Federal Circuit also began to
insinuate first amendment principles into cases alleging reprisal for
whistleblowing. In 1986, the Federal Circuit held in Fiorillo v. De-
partment ofJustice,20 2 that "in the context of an adverse action against
a public employee, the rights under section 2302(b)(8)(A) (prohibi-
tion of reprisal) and the First Amendment's right to free speech
have been considered coextensive rights." 20 3 In fact, up until that
time, the opposite had been considered true.20 4 In 1982, the Board
held that the right to engage in whistleblowing under section
2302(b) (8) was independent of the right to free speech.20 5 This dis-
201. Id.
202. 795 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
203. Fiorillo v. Department ofJustice, 795 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Ger-
lach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 268 (1981)). Fiorillo concerned whether a prohibited personnel prac-
tice had occurred in the termination of a prison guard's appointment for disclosures he had
made to the press which had brought discredit to the agency. Id. at 1545. A stipulation be-
tween the parties that the removal action was based on the disclosures left the court to decide
only whether the disclosures qualified for protection under section 2302(b)(8) and whether
the nature of the causal connection between the disclosures and the termination action consti-
tuted prohibited reprisal. Id. at 1546-47.
204. Although the Board in Gerlach did analogize reprisal law to first amendment law, it
did so only in the limited context of dual motivations. Gerlach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 268, 274-
75 (1981). In Gerlach, the Board adopted only the dual causation analysis of Mt. Healthy that
was aimed at determining the appropriateness of relief. The Board did not adopt the interest-
balancing elements of the Supreme Court's first amendment analysis that are aimed at deter-
mining if a constitutional violation has occurred. Id. at 276; cf Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing teacher's interest as citizen in making public comment
against state interest in promoting efficiency of public services).
205. See Special Counsel ex. rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 366 n.4
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tinction was implicit in the Board's application of the "reasonable
basis" test to determine whether a disclosure is protected.2 06 Under
traditional first amendment analysis, determination of whether a dis-
closure is protected turns, not on whether a reasonable basis exists
for the disclosure, but on whether the disclosure involves a matter
of public concern and whether the legitimate interests of the gov-
ernment to take the action outweighs the interests of the employee
as a citizen to make his disclosures. 207
To the extent that Fiorillo applied the balancing test from Pickering
to reprisal for whistleblowing, it moved the focus of the law even
further from the causation test of Gerlach-Mt. Healthy than had the
retaliatory-motivation balancing test of Warren. Although Warren
represented a new approach in federal reprisal law, it did not depart
significantly from the prior case law's analytical objective of deter-
mining the existence of a prohibited connection between the
whistleblowing and the personnel action. Fiorillo, however, de-
parted significantly from this analytical approach. Fiorillo's interest-
balancing test minimized the importance of a causal connection by
concerning itself with the relative weights of the government's inter-
est to take the personnel action and the employee's interest to blow
the whistle. Under Fiorillo, the party with the more compelling in-
(1982) (holding that Pickering balancing-of-interests standard "does not establish the standard
for protected conduct under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)"). For a discussion of the differences be-
tween the first amendment and the statutory protections of the CSRA, see Vaughn, Statutory
Protection, supra note 8, at 637-41.
Professor Vaughn argues that Congress concluded it was necessary to provide more protec-
tion to the whistleblower under the CSRA than the first amendment provided in order to
advance Congress' goal of promoting whistleblowing. Id. at 640-41. Thus, the statute did
not concern itself with balancing the interest to disclose against the interest to prevent disrup-
tion in the government, as first amendment analysis would have done. Rather, the statute
spoke only of the reasonableness of the disclosure and whether reprisal occurred. Id. Con-
gress determined that as a matter of policy the promotion of whistleblowing outweighed any
incidental disruption to the government that the whistleblowing disclosures might have
caused. Id. This interpretation seems correct because in 1978, when the CSRA was passed,
first amendment rights and limitations on public employees had been well established in Pick-
ering. See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976)
(holding firing of federal worker who openly flaunted homosexuality on job proper); Ring v.
Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (firing of public teacher critical of principal
not in violation of first amendment); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554 (1973) (noting established interest of government in limit-
ing political activities of federal employees). So, to the extent that whistleblowing involves
speech that is in the "public interest," section 2302(b)(8) would have been unnecessary if
Congress merely wanted extant first amendment law to apply.
206. See Vaughn, Statutory Protection, supra note 8, at 637-41 (differentiating section
2302(b)(8)'s reasonable basis test from first amendment balance of interests test).
207. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (protecting freedom of expression
requires balancing employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern against
state interest in promoting efficiency of its employees); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (balancing
interests of teacher as citizen in commenting on matters of public concern against state's
interest as employer in promoting efficiency of public services).
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terest at stake would prevail. A Fiorillo-Pickering balancing test theo-
retically permits an agency to prevail even where retaliatory
motivation outweighed the gravity of the employee's misconduct or
poor performance as long as the interests of the government out-
weighed the interests of the whistleblower. This would probably oc-
cur where the disclosure itself was trivial or where the disruption
caused by the disclosure was so great that the interests of the gov-
ernment could overcome the interests in protecting the disclosure.
Nevertheless, under a first amendment balancing test, an agency
could base its action solely on the protected activity and still not
violate the statute.
In addition to introducing the first amendment calculus into re-
prisal law, Fiorillo undermined the Board's reasonable basis test for
protected activity in another important way. Whereas the Board
had held consistently that reasonableness, not personal motivation,
was to be the determinative factor in evaluating whether a disclosure
qualified for protected status under section 2302(b)(8), Fiorillo held
that "to be given 'whistleblower' status and thus the protections
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), thepimary motivation of the employee
must be the desire to inform the public on matters of public con-
cern, and not personal vindictiveness. ' 208 This, of course, echoed
the whistleblower-as-model-citizen arguments which the Board had
seemingly rejected in Frazier.209 In two broad strokes, Fiorillo signifi-
cantly altered the landscape of federal reprisal law by introducing
the first amendment balancing-of-interests test to weigh the relative
importance of an employee's whistleblowing against management's
discretionary authority to take personnel actions, and by introduc-
ing a subjective motive test to measure the civic-mindedness of the
whistleblower's intentions.
210
Post-Fiorillo Federal Circuit decisions have not applied its first
amendment analysis to claims of reprisal for whistleblowing.
211
Even so, Fiorillo suggests that future reprisal cases in the Federal
Circuit may produce additional anomalies, thereby making federal
reprisal law even more unsettled.
208. Fiorillo v. Department ofJustice, 795 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
209. In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 186-87 (1979) (noting that there can be element of self-
interest in protected whistleblowing activities); see also Berube v. General Servs. Admin., 30
M.S.P.R. 581, 596 (1986) (quoting Special Counsel v. Starrett, 28 M.S.P.R. 60, 70 n.7 (1985)
(noting that laws' protections extend to employees who reasonably believe their charges re-
gardless of alleged personal motivations), rev'd on other grounds, 792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir.
1986)), rev'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 396 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
210. See Vaughn, Federal Employment Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 825,
844-46 (1987) (criticizing Fiorillo decision).
211. See Mings v. Department ofJustice, 813 F.2d 384, 387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (allowing
removal of INS employee due to letter indicating bias against Catholics and Hispanics).
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VIII. BOARD ADOPTS FEDERAL CIRCUIT WARREN TEST IN
EMPLOYEE APPEAL CASES
In a significant 1987 case, the Board applied the Federal Circuit's
four-part test announced in Warren. The case, Oliver v. Department of
Health & Human Services,212 was an employee appeal in which OSC
did not participate. Oliver, a mid-level manager at the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH), appealed her removal for misconduct to
the Board. 213 Oliver's misconduct concerned a series of memo-
randa she had written to high-level officials at NIH. 214 In her mem-
oranda, Oliver expressed great dismay over low minority and female
participation in an agency grant program intended to promote af-
firmative action, and over certain changes in the program that she
believed were detrimental to her career. 215 She charged her super-
visors with discriminatory treatment of program participants, im-
proper program practices, and racist hiring practices, which she
believed evidenced mismanagement. 216 She also charged her su-
pervisors with having mistreated her on matters concerning her per-
formance evaluation, office space, and travel schedule.2 17 The
agency removed her for disrespectful conduct and insubordination
after she disobeyed instructions to use only the employee grievance
procedures to express her discontent and after she refused to pro-
vide information to an advisory board reviewing her program.218
Oliver argued that her removal was based on her memoranda,
which, although strongly worded and highly critical of her superiors,
should have been protected as whistleblowing under section
2302(b)(8). 219 The Board rejected the argument, comprehensively
reexamining CSRA reprisal law and adopting the Warren stan-
dard.220 Applying this standard, the Board concluded that the
agency's motive to retaliate did not outweigh the gravity of the em-
ployee's misconduct and, therefore, the agency's removal action did
not constitute a reprisal for whistleblowing.
221
In discussing whether Oliver's memoranda met the threshold test
of protected activity under section 2302(b)(8), the Board, without
212. 34 M.S.P.R. 465 (1987).
213. Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 467 (1987).
214. Id. at 467-68.
215. Id. at 467.
216. Id. at 470.
217. Id. at 470-71.
218. Id. at 468.
219. Id. at 469-75.





explanation, cited the first amendment test in Osokow v. Office of Per-
sonnel Management,222 that disclosures must touch matters of public
concern to qualify for protection. 223 While the Board in Oliver did
not specifically reject the utility of the traditional reasonable basis
test in whistleblower reprisal cases, its reference to Osokow was sur-
prising given its previous position that the first amendment "d[id]
not establish the standard for protected conduct under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). ' ' 224 The Board's resort to first amendment law as an
appropriate analytical model for section 2302(b)(8) cases recurred
when the Board discussed the protective scope of section
2302(b)(8). The Board wrote:
The Board is not alone in employing this kind of analysis to
determine whether conduct which might appear to be protected
loses that status for any reason. For example, even when dealing
with paramount constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized in first amendment cases to which we analogize, that
whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public con-
cern, and is therefore protected, is circumscribed, and must be
determined by the content, form and context of a given statement,
as revealed by the whole record .... While the case presently
before the Board was not argued in the first amendment context,
the analogy is nevertheless apt, and supports the notion that
in determining whether speech is protected, it is necessary to
carefully scrutinize the facts surrounding the employee's
declaration.225
In addition to its use of first amendment law, the Board followed
the course taken by the Federal Circuit in Fiorillo when it analyzed
Oliver's conduct under an ethical standards test similar to the model
citizen test of Fiorillo.226 The Board wrote:
222. 25 M.S.P.R. 319 (1984).
223. Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 470 (1987) (citing
Osokow v. Office of Personnel Management, 25 M.S.P.R. 319 (1984), in support of its finding
that allegations of disparate treatment toward minorities in Oliver's memoranda enjoyed
qualified immunity under section 2302(b)(8)). Osokow was not, however, a section 2302(b)(8)
case; it was a first amendment case. In Osokow, the Board had used the Pickering balancing test
to find an employee's leaflet not protected under the first amendment because the leaflet had
only limited connections with matters of public concern. Osokow, 25 M.S.P.R. at 323. Yet, it
was this finding that the Board in Oliver specifically cited in support of its decision to grant
Oliver's whistleblowing qualified immunity under the antireprisal statute. Oliver, 34 M.S.P.R.
at 470.
224. Special Counsel ex. rel. Rohrmann v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363, 366 n.4
(1982); see also supra notes 204-05, 209, 242 and accompanying text (discussing first amend-
ment standard relating to 2302(b)(8) violations).
225. Oliver, 34 M.S.P.R. at 472 (citing two first amendment cases, Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983); Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1050 (1985)).
226. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text (discussing model citizen test in
Fiorillo).
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In enacting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), Congress sought to pro-
tect whistleblowers whose "dedication to the highest moral princi-
ples" helps create "a more effective civil service . . . ." It
recognized that this protection was not absolute, however, by pro-
viding certain exceptions, e.g., employees who claim to be
whistleblowers in order to avoid an otherwise meritorious adverse
action. . . . Thus, in deciding whether certain types of conduct
should be immunized from sanction because of the law, the Board
has held that the relevant inquiry is whether expanding the pro-
tections of the law to include the conduct under review would ef-
fectuate the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).... We conclude,
for the following reasons, that protecting appellant's diatribe
would not further the purpose of the law.
227
The Oliver decision represents a discernable shift away from the
objective reasonable basis test and towards a more fluid balancing-
of-interests test more characteristic of first amendment and, in gen-
eral, constitutional law. Under this new approach, disclosures which
do not touch matters of general public concern and employees who
do not blow the whistle out of "the highest moral principles" may
not be found deserving of protection from reprisal under section
2302(b)(8), even if there is a reasonable basis for the disclosures. In
this sense, statutory protection from reprisal risks become a privi-
lege accorded to those who act for "the highest moral principles"
on matters of public concern, instead of a right granted to all federal
employees who reasonably believe that the information they dis-
close evidences one of the enumerated improprieties in the statute.
Such a standard changes the emphasis of the statute from one which
promotes reasonably based disclosures of wrongdoing under an ob-
jective standard of review, to one which promotes only morally prin-
cipled disclosures under a subjective standard of review. Arguably,
it simply mirrors existing first amendment protections. For federal
employees trying to decide whether or not to blow the whistle, this
shift makes predetermination of the protected status of an intended
disclosure less predictable. Emphasis on the ethical quality of the
whistleblower's motivation and the public-interest nature of the dis-
closure as outcome-determinative factors in the establishment of pa-
rameters for protected activity may deter employees from
whistleblowing rather than encouraging them. Furthermore, a first
amendment approach may be too narrow and lead to the punish-
ment of a protected disclosure which is not in the general "public
interest" and which causes disruption. Such an approach could also
lead to the blending of broad policy disagreements publicly articu-
227. Oliver, 34 M.S.P.R. at 472 (citations omitted).
1056
1991] WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 1057
lated by federal employees on the one hand with protected disclo-
sures of wrongdoing on the other. Congress, however, intended the
former to be subject to a first amendment balancing test and the
latter to be absolutely protected if reasonably believed.
The implications of Oliver to whistleblower protection reach be-
yond the facts of that case. The Board concluded in Oliver that the
general content of Oliver's disclosures concerning affirmative action
policies qualified for protection either as matters of public concern
or as matters of a more personal nature which satisfied the reason-
able basis test.228 It also concluded that the agency removed Oliver
because the tone and wording of her disclosures, some of which
were of a personal nature, were "abusive," "insolent," "caustic,"
and "insubordinate. ' 229 The Board then measured Oliver's per-
sonal motives in making her disclosures against the newly adopted
"highest moral principles" standard.230 Under this test, the Board
found that the offensive tone of the disclosures required it to strike
the Warren balance in favor of the agency.
231
228. Id. at 470. In reaching this conclusion, the Board declared that Oliver's personal
motivations did not bear on the reasonableness of her disclosures, reaffirming its long-held
position on this issue. Id. This statement is anomalous in light of the Board's ultimate find-
ings on the propriety of her disclosures.
229. Id. at 474. The Board described Oliver's memos as having unfairly characterized her
supervisors as lacking personal integrity and moral authority; as dishonest, incompetent, ap-
pallingly ignorant, hysterical, irrational and ludicrous in the extreme; of not being qualified
for their positions; instituting management practices akin to lunacy; and possessing paranoid
assumptions and a lynch mob mentality. Id. at 472.
230. Id. at 474.
231. The Board wrote:
We conclude that, while appellant's allegations were in and of themselves pro-
tected, the bulk of them do not concern the public interest when considered in their
entirety. Rather, her apparent interest in causing office disruption, as evidenced by
her insubordination, and her obvious desire to malign the targets of her disclosures,
as evidenced by her insolent manner and caustic style, substantially overshadowed
the alleged waste, fraud, or mismanagement addressed.
Id. at 474.
In denying Oliver's petition on appeal, the Federal Circuit endorsed the Board's analysis of
Oliver's disclosures. The court wrote:
Oliver argues that it is impossible to separate the protected disclosures from the
words used to make them. This is incorrect. As this court has previously held, the
circumstances surrounding the making of protected disclosures may provide in-
dependent ground for disciplinary action which do not violate 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). ...
Oliver also contends that the board (sic) erred in considering the nexus require-
ment because nexus was conceded by the agency. According to Oliver, the agency's
only reason for firing her was her disclosures, and the board's inquiry should have
ended when it found the disclosures to be protected. The board correctly consid-
ered the nexus requirement because the circumstances surrounding the disclosures
had to be considered. The board found that, while the disclosures were protected,
they were not primarily concerned with matters of public interest. ... As the board
found, [her] comments demonstrate a desire to cause disruption and to malign her
supervisors which outweighs the alleged waste and mismanagement disclosed.
Next, Oliver claims that the board's opinion upholds the removal on a totally dif-
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It can reasonably be argued that section 2302(b)(8) protections
could not have been meant to apply to statements which were so
inflammatory in tone and style that they constituted misconduct
under a subject-neutral standard.23 2 Oliver, then, could have been
decided by finding that the inflammatory parts of Oliver's charges
had been unreasonable and were not, therefore, protected by sec-
tion 2302(b)(8) under the reasonable basis test. Instead, the Board
granted qualified protection to Oliver's disclosures in their entirety
and then stripped them piecemeal of their qualified protections
under the first amendment, model-citizen, and Warren-balancing
tests. If the Board had found Oliver's highly inflammatory language
not reasonably based, it could have sustained the agency's discipli-
nary action as easily under the existing standards of Gerlach-Mt.
Healthy without having to inject moral and first amendment princi-
ples into the Warren reprisal equation.
IX. A TEN-YEAR SUMMARY OF FEDERAL REPRISAL LAW
The past ten years have witnessed the beginnings of the develop-
ment of federal reprisal law created by the CSRA. Thus far, the law
has struggled to resolve the inevitable conflict between two distinct
congressional policies of the CSRA that have sometimes been at
cross purposes with each other. One of those policies promotes and
encourages the disclosure of waste, fraud, abuse of authority, and
mismanagement. 233 It accepts as necessary the attendant disruption
that such disclosures may engender. The other promotes manage-
ment's discretionary authority to eliminate disruptions caused by
inefficiency by encouraging management to discharge employees
"who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet re-
quired standards." 23 4 The Board and the few federal courts which
have confronted this conflict have attempted to devise analytical
models to accommodate both competing interests. 23 5 However, the
ferent ground from that relied upon by the agency. This argument is without merit.
As we discussed above, the wording of Oliver's disclosures can be considered apart
from the disclosures themselves, which is what the board did in this case.
Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., No. 87-3527, slip. op. at 4-5 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
20, 1988) (citations omitted).
232. See Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 475 (1987)
(noting that "[n]othing in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), its legislative history, or the cases interpret-
ing it indicates that all statements made in the course of alleged whistleblowing no matter the
degree of the invective employed, are unconditionally protected").
233. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2301(b)(9) (West Supp. 1990).
234. Id § 2301(b)(6).
235. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit court standard
applied to whistleblower claiming reprisal); see also Hagmeyer v. United States, 757 F.2d 1281,
1284 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing elements of reprisal cases); Sullivan v. Department of Navy,
720 F.2d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing same); In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.R. 163, 165-66
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balance these models have struck has not been consistent and has
sometimes created ambiguous and elusive standards which offer
only marginal guidance to the two million civil service employees
who must conform their conduct to these standards.
The record demonstrates that OSC, recognizing that an effective
whistleblower protection program may require the vindication of a
few marginal employees because of their protected disclosures, has
advocated interpretations of the law which would favor
whistleblowers and encourage whistleblowing activities. Response
by the Board and the courts to OSC's advocacy has been decidedly
mixed. Initially, the Board rejected OSC arguments for an expan-
sive interpretation of the substantive and procedural safeguards for
whistleblowers under the CSRA. 2 3 6 However, by mid-decade, OSC
had made some progress before the Board in expanding the law's
protection. 237 More recent judicial interpretations have indicated
that on the tenth anniversary of the CSRA, the pendulum had swung
back in favor of management discretion to the detriment of
whistleblower protection, making it more difficult for OSC and
whistleblowers to prevail in litigation before the Board.
238
X. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT OF 1989: A RENEWED
COMMITMENT TO PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS FROM
REPRISAL
As early as 1986, Congress began to move in earnest to draft leg-
islation to toughen the CSRA protections against reprisal for
whistleblowing. That year, the House passed H.R. 4033239 which
provided, among other things, the right of any individual who may
have suffered a prohibited personnel practice to appeal directly to
the MSPB, regardless of the significance of the personnel action suf-
(1979) (discussing same), aft'd, 672 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting whistleblower claim
must be scrutinized so protection not misused to thwart disciplinary action).
236. See supra notes 114-39 and accompanying text (discussing Board's acceptance of Mt.
Healthy reprisal test requiring that protected conduct be significant factor in challenged
agency action over OSC's objection).
237. In the mid-eighties, OSC efforts met with only partial success before the Board. The
Board rebuffed two OSC attempts to extend CSRA protections from reprisal to federal em-
ployees of two entities. Special Counsel v. Everett, 28 M.S.P.R. 348, 352-53 (1985) (refusing
CSRA protections for National Guard technicians); Special Counsel v. Peace Corps, 31
M.S.P.R. 225, 230-32 (1986) (refusing CSRA protections for Peace Corps Country Directors).
However, OSC was successful in extending protections to reemployed annuitants. Acting
Special Counsel v. United States Customs Serv., 31 M.S.P.R. 342, 348-51 (1986).
238. See Vaughn, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Legal Regulation of Public Bureaucracies,
31 How. LJ. 187, 194-95 (1988) (discussing restrictive approaches taken by courts to
whistleblowing issues and OSC, including judicial rebuff of OSC's attempt to enforce ethics
regulations through its disciplinary action authority).
239. H.R. 4033, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 25,156-62 (1986).
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fered, and to obtain judicial review of the Board's decision in the
federal district courts. 240 The bill would have lowered the standard
of proof for whistleblower reprisal from preponderant evidence to
substantial evidence and would have required OSC to represent all
alleged victims of prohibited personnel practices before the
Board.241 H.R. 4033 further proposed to permit agencies to defend
against a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that the challenged
action had been based solely on legitimate management reasons. 242
In 1987, Congress returned to the issue of whistleblower protec-
tion with renewed commitment to enhance the existing protections
for victims of whistleblower reprisal. Both the House and the Sen-
ate drafted versions of the "Whistleblower Protection Act of
1987."243 Both bills contained a private right of action, 244 ex-
panded judicial review options, 245 and a lower burden of proof for
employees in whistleblower reprisal cases. 246 By 1988, Congress
passed S. 508, a modified version of the Senate bill from the previ-
ous year, only to see it pocket-vetoed by outgoing President
Reagan.24
7
However, in March 1989, a compromise was reached between the
Congress and the new administration which resulted in S. 20,248 the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA).249 This reform bill
contains most of the pro-whistleblower features of earlier proposals
with the exception of authority for the Special Counsel to seek judi-
cial review of a decision of the MSPB, a prominent feature in earlier
proposals. 250 The most significant change to the substantive law
240. Id. § 1221. Under the CSRA, only employees who had completed their one-year
probationary period in the competitive service and certain veterans holding appointments in
the excepted service were given the right to appeal to the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1988).
Even then, the right was limited to actions which were significant, i.e., removal, suspension for
more than 14 days, reduction in grade, reduction in pay, and certain furlough decisions. Id.
241. H.R. 4033, supra note 239, § 1214.
242. H.R. 4033, supra note 239, §§ 1212, 1214, & 1221. The Senate failed to act upon the
House bill during the 99th Congress.
243. H.R. 25, Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the Subconim. of
Civil Service of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Services, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 508,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S15328-35 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988).
244. H.R. 25, supra note 243, § 1221(a); S. 508, supra note 243, § 1221(a).
245. H.R. 4033, supra note 243, § 1214(c); S. 508, supra note 243, § 1214(c).
246. H.R. 4033, supra note 243, § 2302(b)(8); S. 508, supra note 243, § 2302(b)(8).
247. See Memorandum of Disapproval by President Reagan 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1377 (Oct. 26, 1988) (noting President's withholding of approval of S. 508 because bill would
alter proper balance under existing law between whistleblower protection and effective man-
agement of federal workforce and would unconstitutionally restrict Executive's power to su-
pervise Special Counsel and resolve disputes between Special Counsel and MSPB).
248. S. 20, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H740 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989).
249. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
250. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 provides for a new independent right of
action to whistleblowers alleging a violation of section 2302(b)(8). 5 U.S.C.A. § 1221 (West
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was the deletion of the word reprisal from sections 2302(b)(8) and
(9) and the substitution of the phrase "because of. ''251 Congress
made these changes in direct response to what it perceived to be the
unduly restrictive decisions of the Board and the courts which had
made it difficult to prove reprisal.252 The legislative history of this
amendment reveals that congressional reformers were critical of the
Starrett and Harvey courts for having misinterpreted the CSRA's pro-
tection for whisfleblowers in section 2302(b)(8) with their punitive-
intent requirement, 253 a criticism the Special Counsel had advanced
in congressional hearings. 254 The change expressed Congress' in-
tent that the statute prohibited actions that are based on protected
conduct, regardless of the personal motivation of the responsible
officials. If a causal link can be established between the protected
conduct and the personnel action, the statute has been violated. 255
The new law goes even further. It defines precisely what quantum
of proof is required to justify corrective action in section 2302(b) (8)
cases. Believing that the existing law required proof that the pro-
tected disclosure be a significant or substantial factor in the action
taken, Congress lowered the threshold burden of proof by establish-
ing a "contributing factor" test in corrective action cases under sec-
Supp. 1990) (allowing individual right of action in certain reprisal cases). The new amend-
ment to the CSRA also permits the victim of a retaliatory personnel action based on protected
disclosures to request the MSPB to stay the alleged retaliatory action prior to hearing, an
option previously granted only to the Special Counsel. Id § 1221(c). The new law does re-
quire the individual to file a preappeal complaint with OSC and wait 120 days or until OSC
has terminated its investigation, which ever occurs first, before filing an appeal with the
Board. Id. § 1214(a)(3).
251. Il § 2302(b)(8)-(9) (prohibiting personnel actions which are threatened, taken, or
not taken because of conduct protected by those subsections).
252. See S. REP. No. 413, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1988) (noting Board has been
overly restrictive in standards for proving reprisal).
253. See id. (commenting on Court of Appeals' narrow definition of retaliation and
reprisal).
254. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Federal
Services, Post Office, and Civil Services of the Comm. on Government Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 408
(1987) (statement of Mary F. Wieseman, OSC) (criticizing court decisions in whistleblower
reprisal cases).
255. See id. at 15 (noting that employee has established prima facie case when it is shown
whistleblowing was factor in personnel action). Explanatory text on the genesis and purpose
of the amendments to section 2302(b)(8) appears in the 1988 Senate committee report on S.
508 that was incorporated by reference into the legislative history of S. 20. 135 CONG. REC.
S2794 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (remarks of Sen. C. Levin); 135 CONG. REc. H747 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1989) (remarks of Rep. G. Sikorski). The Senate committee report stated: "In effect,
[the courts' interpretations] could require employees in corrective action cases to show not
just that an action against them was based on a protected disclosure, but also that the official's
motives in taking the retaliatory action were inappropriate." S. REP. No. 413, supra note 252,
at 15. By substituting a "because of" causation standard, the reformers intended to make
clear that the precise state of mind of the responsible officials was not the litmus test for a
violation. "Regardless of the official's motives, personnel actions against employees should
quite simply not be based on protected activities such as whistleblowing." Id. at 16 (emphasis
added).
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tion 2302(b)(8).256 Based on the explanatory discussion in the
enactment history of the WPA, it seems clear that the new contribut-
ing factor standard was intended to make corrective action the norm
whenever a protected disclosure, alone or in connection with other
factors, tended to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.257
With these two important changes, Congress returned the focus of
whistleblower protection inquiry to the factors considered by the
employer in making a personnel decision and away from the particu-
lar motivations of the employer. The WPA amendments ensure a
whistleblowing-neutral decision-making process that is more consis-
tent with the CSRA goals of promoting and encouraging federal em-
ployees to disclose evidence of waste, fraud, and abuse of authority
than the prevailing motivation-based inquiry established by case
law.
CONCLUSION
With the recent passage of the WPA amendments, the federal civil
service begins its next decade under the CSRA with new standards
designed to ease the burden on employees and the OSC to prove
that employees have been disadvantaged by their whistleblowing.
The congressional creators of whistleblower protection firmly re-
jected the law's development at the Board and in the courts during
the first decade under the CSRA. The WPA returns us to 1979,
when the law of reprisal began its development. Where the WPA
amendments will lead in the next ten years is, of course, un-
known. 258 What is clear from this survey of the OSC's role in the
256. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1214(b)(4), 1221(e) (West Supp. 1990) (providing "the Board shall
order such corrective action as the Board considers appropriate if the [Special Counsel, appel-
lant employee, former employee, or applicant] has demonstrated that a disclosure described
under section 2302(b)(8) was a contributing factor in the personnel action which was taken or
is to be taken against [the individual]").
257. 135 CONG. REC. S2779-80 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (remarks of Sen. C. Levin) (pro-
viding retaliation requires showing disclosure was only contributing and not substantial fac-
tor); see id. at S2781 (reprinted letter from Attorney General Thornburgh to Sen. Levin, Mar.
3, 1989) (clarifying new standard as contributing factor); id. at S2787 (remarks of Sen. W.
Cohen) (whistleblowing need only be contributing factor); id. at S2788 (remarks of Sen. C.
Grassley) (same); id. at S2793 (remarks of Sen. D. Pryor) (contributing factor is new standard).
On the House side, see 135 CoNG. REC. H747 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (remarks of Rep. S.
Kursh) (agreeing to clarify word "factor" by adding "contributing"); id. at H751 (remarks of
Rep. P. Schroeder) (contributing factor means any factor that tends to affect outcome); id. at
H752 (remarks of Rep. B. Gilman) (contributing factor is new standard).
258. In December 1990, the Board issued its first decision on the merits of a claim of
whistleblower "reprisal" under the WPA. McDaid v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev.,
No. AT122190W0400, slip op. (M.S.P.B. Dec. 6, 1990). Rather than clarify the conceptual
differences between the causal connection requirement of the "because of" clause of the
WPA and the retaliatory motivation requirement of pre-WPA case law, the McDaid decision
left this issue open for future interpretation. In McDaid, the Board frequently used the words
"retaliation," "retaliatory motive," "protected disclosures," and "whistleblowing activity" in-
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development of reprisal law in the first decade of the CSRA is that
OSC efforts to expand the legal protections for whistleblowers
through the MSPB have had mixed results. Some of these efforts
have succeeded. When they did not, the OSC has been constrained,
as it must be, to operate within the framework of the law as inter-
preted by the Board and the courts. The adoption of the WPA
amendments, however, reflects to a large extent OSC's historical ad-
vocacy in the development of federal reprisal law.
terchangeably in its first discussion of "the nature of the parties' respective burdens" under
the new law. Id. at 6-8, 10-12. It is far from clear whether the Board intended McDaid to
require proof of personal retaliatory motivation on the part of an agency official or whether it
merely intended to hold that prohibited reprisal or retaliation under the WPA occurs when-
ever the protected disclosure or whistleblowing is a contributing factor in the challenged ac-
tion. Since the McDaid decision, at least one administrative judge has held that the critical
inquiry in whistleblower cases focuses on the presence or absence of evidence of retaliatory
animus. See Rockwell v. Department of the Navy, No. SE075299010267, slip op. at 21
(M.S.P.B. Dec. 17, 1990) (noting that 'contributing factor' concept relates primarily to crea-
tion of retaliatory animus). These recent developments suggest that the personal motivation
controversy in federal reprisal law may still be unsettled.

